Sorry, I've been pulled in too many different directions. That message flow would work, I think. Getting a CSR, properly constructed, signed, etc. from the pledge is key. The CA can make changes before issuing a certificate, but the RA cannot. The two step process is the only way I can see to automate what we do manually today.
Michael Richardson's 'civil serpents' made me laugh. Although most of those 'serpents' are military or contractors. In the end, the easier we can make it for them to do the 'right' thing, the better off we will be. Deb Cooley On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 2:50 AM Owen Friel (ofriel) <ofr...@cisco.com> wrote: > Deb in your govt PKI world then, would the flow be something like: > > > > > > There is no CSR Attributes exchange that allows the RA to tell the Pledge > to use a particular CN/SAN. > > > > Pledge sends CSR with, say, SAN=serialnumberx > > > > RA sends newOrder with identifier= serialnumberx > > > > ACME CA decides that the identity should be “ > serialnumberx.devices.some-gov-dept.example.org” (e.g. based on the RA > identity) > > > > ACME returns an authorization challenge for “serialnumberx.devices. > some-gov-dept.example.org” to the RA. > > > > The RA must then prove ownership of that DNS domain before the ACME CA > will issue the cert. > > > > > > > > > > This is how we envisaged the enterprise/civilian workflow: > > > > RA owns the domain e.g. devices.ra.example.org > > > > Pledge connects to RA using its IDevID and sends CSR Attributes request > > > > RA extracts serial#=abc123 (or whatever) from IDevID and appends domain to > it > > > > RA tells pledge in CSR Attributes response to include e.g. SAN= > abc123.devices.ra.example.org in CSR > > > > Pledge sends CSR with SAN= abc123.devices.ra.example.org > > > > RA sends newOrder with identifier= abc123.devices.ra.example.org > > > > ACME returns an authorization challenge for abc123.devices.ra.example.org > > > > RA proves ownership of abc123.devices.ra.example.org and ACME issues cert. > > > > (or using acme-subdomains, proves ownership of devices.ra.example.org) > > > > > > > > > > *From:* Deb Cooley <debcool...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* 10 June 2021 17:52 > *To:* Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca> > *Cc:* Owen Friel (ofriel) <ofr...@cisco.com>; acme@ietf.org; Cooley, > Dorothy E <deco...@nsa.gov> > *Subject:* Re: [Acme] comments on: draft-ietf-acme-integrations-03.txt > > > > Michael, > > > > In my world (government PKI systems), the RA doesn't get to do that. > Either the CSR is accepted or it is rejected. The CA has a profile it > follows, if the CSR is missing things, the CA adds them before the > certificate is signed. The RA can do none of that. In our case, most RAs > are actually people, so there can be a back channel to the requestor which > can be used to sort it all out. > > > > How this all happens in the case of 'little things', I don't know. We do > have a 'portal' for devices, but it would probably be quite 'heavy' for > your use cases. > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 8, 2021 at 4:15 PM Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca> > wrote: > > > Owen Friel \(ofriel\) <ofriel=40cisco....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > deb> Again architecture: If the EST Server sits in front of a large > deb> organization, then domain validation is more interesting, and the > deb> Get /csrattrs may or may not be able to recommend a SAN, right? I > deb> can see that policy oids could be provided, if that is a thing in > deb> these systems. [we use policy oids in US DOD, but that is > possibly > deb> uncommon elsewhere.] > > ofriel> That is also a fair point, for complex deployments its not > clear > ofriel> what policy the EST server may want to apply before assigning a > ofriel> SAN. The text in section 3 currently states: > > “EST servers could use this mechanism to tell the client what fields > to > include in the CSR Subject and Subject Alternative Name fields” > > ofriel> We could beef up that statement and explicitly state that the > ofriel> policy by which the EST determines the SAN to specify is > ofriel> explicitly out of scope. And also note that policy OIDs could > be > ofriel> provided. > > I would love to hear from operators and designers of CAs about how a > RA can communicate to the CA about things it doesn't like, or wishes to > add, > to a certificate request. > > The CSR is immutable, being signed by the EE requesting. > ACME doesn't provide any out-of-CSR mechanism, nor does CMC or CMP (correct > me if I'm wrong here!)... Max and I talked a lot about this when design > RFC8995, > and we had to conclude that it was simply non-standard. > > In the case of ACP (RFC8994) use of BRSKI, like the Ford Model-T, the CSR > may > contain anything the Pledge wants to put in, it will get an otherName > containing the encoded ACP IPv6 ULA. > > In implementing, I also realized that the GET /csrattrs is > pseudo-idempotent. > When first called, it needs to allocate an IPv6 ULA for that node, and it > needs to store it, such that whenever the same IDevID does the GET, it gets > the same answer. It's uncomfortable having to change database state on a > GET, but at least the result is cachable! > > In the ACME integrations, we haven't said how the RA will decide what > dNSName > SAN will be returned, but the same property will apply. The RA needs to > collect a CSR that it can pass along up ACME, and for which is can do > dns-01 > challenges. > > -- > Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting ) > Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide > >
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