Mark,

How many users to site are you talking about in the no local DC scenario. 10, 20..50 ?

Cheers
Mylo

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

I've looked at using Virtual Server for small sites and it makes sense
to me.  The only drawback is that all your eggs are in one basket - lose
the host and you lose everything.  The same's true for patching as
you'll need downtime on all of the guest machines when the host is
updated.
One nice advantage of using Virtual Server in this scenario is the
ability to access the Virtual Server Administration Console and
therefore have complete remote control over the virtual hardware and the
console.  This is ideal for small sites with no local admin/technical
staff.

I have to agree with Joe about whether you actually need a DC or not
though.  At a number of sites we've chosen not to deploy a local DC at
all.  In fact, we tend to tie the DC deployment decision into whether or
not that site is going to have Exchange server locally.

Regards,
Mark.

-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of joe
Sent: 07 October 2005 01:18
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Server Roles

Mylo,
I pretty much agree with Gil but I don't think most people or orgs have
the slightest idea how to evaluate their environments for risks. Plus
too many people have the mindset that if they don't know of a way to
hack something, no way exists. If this is the direction taken, bring
someone else in to do it. Even if you do that it still may not work out
well though because of assumptions that are made during the analysis
that don't end up being true in implementation. "Oh yeah, of course we
look at the logs.... " "Of course we patch right away and watch the
security bulletins...". The fewer vectors available to compromise tends
to mean the less chance of being compromised.
I think max paranoa is the safer path.
IIS on a DC makes me very queasy. Granted it is based on the history of
IIS and it is "all fixed" now, but consider... How many exploits do you
need against your DCs before it is considered too many? Is a single
compromise acceptable? I don't mind losing most one off servers, it
hurts but I can survive. If someone walked through a hole on a DC or a
cert server your base security for the entire environment, all servers
and clients, has been compromised and you can not easily have much faith
in those pieces any longer. I can rebuild an IIS server in a couple of
hours, how fast can you rebuild from scratch your domain structure? Your
Cert structure?
Exchange... Well I have all sorts of love for Exchange but right off, if
Exchange is running on a GC, you have no fault tolerance or load
balancing for directory work, that is the one and only GC that will ever
be used. The Exchange provider should be complaining about that all
alone. Failover to another GC in another site may suck, but at least it
is possible.

If someone insists that they can only have one server at a site, at this
time my recommendation is that it not be a DC. If you keep your GPOs in
check this shouldn't be a serious issue unless you have a crappy
network.
DCs are a special case and should be treated specially, it isn't just
some extra service on a machine. Services I will run on a DC are things
like WINS and DNS and quite honestly I don't much like DNS on DCs
either. It bothers me to run a service on the machine that the DC is
completely dependent on.
With WINS, I always deployed LMHOSTS files on the DCs, that way if WINS
failed, things still worked.
 joe


-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Gil Kirkpatrick
Sent: Thursday, October 06, 2005 7:07 PM
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Server Roles

As you mentioned, this topic has been debated frequently on this list.
Running other services on a DC raises the hackles on the back of my
neck, and I expect that most on the list will have similar reactions.
And you've listed most of the reasons why the proposed deployment would
be a bad idea. But truthfully, the "right" answer has to be based on a
proper risk assessment for your client's environment. I think in the
past most people either a) never did a risk assessment, or b) didn't
understand the risks with branch office DCs running multiple services.
Consequently, most AD professionals now default to "its pure insanity"
when asked about this kind of deployment. The answer of course, as with
most everything, is "it depends".

Because every organization has different perceptions of and
sensitivities to different kinds of threats (some organizations have a
high tolerance for service failure, but a low tolerance for trade-secret
theft, for instance), and because the threat profile is different for
each organization (how protected are the remote DCs? How accessible is
the network? How effective is patch deployment?) the only way to
evaluate the proposed deployment is to do a proper risk analysis in the
context of the organizational environment.

So if I were faced with this situation, I would recommend a threat
assessment and risk analysis project to evaluate the risks associated
with this sort of deployment. A good paper is Butler and Fishbeck's
Multi-Attribute Risk Assessment
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~Compose/paper_abstracts/butler-fishbeck-02.html,
but your favorite CISSP text covers it as well. Because you understand
the threats and risks in the proposed deployment, you can make sure that
they are properly represented in the analysis, and the customer can
weigh the
(definite) costs of additional servers against the (potential) costs of
a security failure.

That all being said, I think that running Exchange, SMS, or IIS on a DC
is a Really Bad Idea (tm).

My $.25...

-gil

-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Mylo
Sent: Thursday, October 06, 2005 11:44 AM
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: [ActiveDir] Server Roles

Hi All,

It's a well trodden path (in these forums anyway) that I'm about to
discuss but I'd like to get our resident experts 10 cents worth on a
rather interesting issue I've run into.. I'm working at a client,
reviewing an AD design,  where 2 support providers are providing a
migration path to an AD2003/Exchange 2003 solution (from NT4/Ex5.5). One

of the providers is responsible for AD (desktop/SMS/File and Print)
design and the other E-Mail design/deployment.  This is a single
forest/single domain solution where both have agreed to work in concert,

together in the spirit of harmony and SLA's... There's a possibility
that proxy tools may be used (e.g. Aelita/Quest type tooling) to 'limit'

or delegate AD activities for each party, with these interfaces largely
limited to managing AD delegation of OU/user/group/machine objects ... resource management (AV/Backup/SMS/DHCP/DNS/WINS etc) still requires
native or 3rd party tooling.

The problem lies in the fact that the client (on the advice of the
support
provider)  has opted for consolidating File and print / SMS/ AD roles
onto a single server at sites of up to around 200 users. Above this size
the solution scales out to multiple servers, but continues to adhere to
the principal of dual role, namely placing File and Print together with
domain controllers and/or SMS and IIS together with a domain controller.
In the legacy solution these roles were separated onto different serves
and the file and print locally managed (also meaning that there's an
awful lot of crap that will be migrated into AD as a result of combining
these roles into one box) ... The combined role

approach was given the green light largely for (I believe) cost reasons,

but I do have *ahem* a number of concerns with this approach.

Security
=====
- multiple roles on a single server and no-no's such as placing IIS and
SMS on a DC
- it tends to look at security from a 'top down' perspective (i.e. it's
a single AD provider therefore we're safe)... i don't think this flies
simply because of the implications of using 3rd party s/w such as
anti-virus and backup on dual-role servers where local admin rights are
required, which equates to domain admin rights;  providing a rather
scary escalation path to being able to doing anything to anybody in the
domain. Scenarios where the AD provider outsources to another party
(e.g. in smaller countries)....if A (the client) trusts B (the support
provider) who trusts C (outsourcee), should A trust C? ... I knew trusts

would come in handy one day :-)

Stability
=====
- Print Services on domain controllers
- Migrating clutter off the legacy file and print into AD (10,000's
local/global groups)
- If there's a mail server on-site with a combined server then e-Mail
availability is linked to the whim and stability of file and print
services/IIS/SMS etc.
- Backup/Restore .. increased chance of human error where day-to-day
restore operations associated with File and Print may result in key
files being overwritten (relating to DC operations)

Availability
=======
- Reboots during the day are likely to be more numerous through bulking
up roles... affecting the whole office (e.g. AD  replication gets stuck,

BITS kills IIS etc.)

Accountability
=========
- Difficult to prove anything was done by anybody at any time.

Performance
=========
- Means enabling write caching on a DC for the benefit of file and print

services (i.e. read-optimised RAID versus write-optimised RAID)

Possible solutions
============
1. Use VS2005 and virtual machines
2. Place File and Print alone on smaller sites with no DC, say up to 25
users and above that use separate DC and File and Print/SMS  roles on
separate servers .
3. Buy SBS for each smaller site and setup x number of trusts to the
central sites  :0) 4. Live with it and stop worrying

Am I being overly paranoid with this dual/triple role thing or is this
really as bad as it looks ? Does anyone actually advocate this as a
solution if they were given a greenfields choice?
I'd appreciate your candour and feedback...

Thanks,
Mylo
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