thoughts in-line
 
-ajm

 
On 6/8/06, Noah Eiger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Thanks, Brian. Don't you sleep? It's late in Chicago ;-)

>> Sleep?  That's something he can catch up on later on in life ;)

802.1x is the direction they are heading. Right now, it is cost-prohibitive. So the question is less "can I control this access" but "should I"? Is that over-reacting?

 >>Over-reacting?  No, but you do need to balance it with business need.  I know I'm preaching to the choir, but you did ask for an opinion (I happen to have one :)  What's the risk? The risk is zero day exploits.  Access to the network should be controlled in my opinion.  If it's wireless, you cannot enforce connection at the physical level.  On the other hand, it's not much different than if somebody came in with a laptop and a network cable and found an empty cubicle.  For that reason, you may want to include a policy that restricts wireless and non-wireless clients as a general rule.  Allow for exceptions as needed. There will be a few. Also, there is no real reason for a policy if you can't enforce it.  Good to start there, and work towards it however.

Again with the VPN. My thoughts were to push it with an MSI, so I see how to control its distribution. The question is should I limit it to just the domain computers? How big is the risk? If the risk from home computers is virus and malware, how do I justify preventing folks from running it on their home Macs?

 >> VPN's are a difficult one.  Many of the companies I've seen *want* their employees to have access from home machines. Why? Because then they don't have to spend money on a computer resource for them. This leads to a lot of sticky issues however.  Data has a tendency to go to uncontrolled machines, uncontrolled/unauthorized software and malware has a tenedency to start showing up because some guy's teenager decided to load IM and some music program which infected his machine and then everyone's machine on the corporate network resulting in 10 days downtime.  (get the feeling I've seen it?) Some other issues that come to mind are that because they use their personal pc, they expect support if they run into an issue. Can you imagine what a mess that is and how much that support will cost? Anyway, some thoughts to address it: what is it that the users need access to? Typically, about 90% of the access it to check email. Rarely is it for data entry unless their job is to work from home. Provide email access from a web browser and see if you still need vpn access.  For those that need vpn access, provide them with a controlled asset, i.e. a laptop.  I say a laptop because a laptop can make their life SO much easier and your support so much less.  The user is already familiar with the laptop and any travel is also done via laptop. If not a laptop, then a company owned assett is still advised and you'll need to set proper expectations about usage, ownership of data, etc. Finally, many companies have setup multiple solutions - citrix solutions that allow the users to remote in to a remote session and only utilize the apps that are published vs. full VPN connectivity. They'll also utilize the abilty of health checks and fixes prior to allowing any host to connect to the network. This works for both wireless, and external clients, and can be extended to the internal clients if you so choose. Quarantine networks help to enforce a security software manifest policy such as "you'll be running the latest company approved version of anti-virus software have at least these hotfixes.." etc. Without that approval, you'll get the chance to get that software from publicly available networks, but not much else. Two factor authentication for VPN clients is also desirable to help with access controls.  I'm sure there's more, but my thoughts are to clearly identify the requirements, prioritize them in order of importance, and then propose based on the budget/tolerance.  I absolutely think having a policy is important to protect the company assets and not overburden the support structure.

Thanks.

 

-- nme

 


From: Brian Desmond [mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 10:43 PM

Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] OT: Security Policy Thoughts

 

My suggestion is that you implement 802.1x port auth to implement port based authentication. You can use this to implement guest vlans with the policy routing you describe.

 

Isn't the Cisco VPN a MSI? Use Group Policy or SMS if you have it. You can do some NAC stuff with Cisco VPN as well as the personal firewall built into it.

 

I don't see how you plan to prohibit OS X at least – put it on the guest vlan if you must, but, realize that the marketing, pr, etc people may live in a Mac world.

 

Thanks,

Brian Desmond

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

 

c - 312.731.3132

 

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Noah Eiger
Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2006 12:16 AM
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: [ActiveDir] OT: Security Policy Thoughts

 

Hi:

 

I am facing some IT policy questions and wanted to get some perspectives. In each of these areas, I am trying determine how restrictive I need to be. The client has four sites connected over high-speed links. I have good backing from management but will undoubtedly get resistance on some of these.

 

The client is small, under 200 employees with most in one office. Some small field offices are not managed (i.e., have workgroup networks, often with a small server, but no AD). There are no SOX requirements and the data are not sensitive ( e.g., no credit cards). Almost entirely Windows XP; all DC's run W2k3.

 

Any thoughts on these topics welcome.

 

Connecting to the wired network. They do not run any IDS or machine-based authentication. Given that, written policy carries some weight. I want to require all non-domain machines to connect only to a "public" VLAN that goes only to the Internet. I would apply this even to staff "personal" computers, those of contractors (including me), and machines from those field offices that are not on the domain.

 

VPN. They run a Cisco VPN. I want to distribute the client only to domain-based machines. Others want the client for their home computers, etc.

 

Other Operating Systems. I don't want to allow other OS's on the network, unless we manage them. But what is the threat posed by a Linux or OS X box on the network?

 

As always, many thanks.

 

-- nme

 

 

 

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