What I mean by commonsense logic is akin to what linguists say about the innate parameters of language -- an a-priori constraint for word order: either subject-verb-object or subject-object-verb. Our brains may be predisposed to a logic re word order even though that logic can work a few different ways....but all require a subject, a verb, an object to make sense.
If we are genetically "wired" for elementary systems of simple logic relationships, then it would seem reasonable to suggest that within a culture of language use, we do mature with a fairly good set of language patterns and asssociations. When certain word patterns are presented to us, we consciously evoke a range of associative "meanings" and depending on the simplicity or complexity of the word patterns, we can usually discover what the words are intended to convey to us. My point is that Cheerskep seems to assume that we are always at the most opaque stage when we confront a word message (despite his disclaimer of forks and knives, the "serviceable" a word which claims inherent "fuzziness") and I am saying that it is not so because we are prepped for many different types of word meanings and are very likely, in addition, born with mental structures that ensure identifiable commonsense logic patterns, like subject, object, verb. (see Hauser, Moral Minds, 2006). I would never say Cheerskep is a liar re his listings. To lie about something one must know what truth is being distorted or contradicted. Since none of know whether any statement will absolutely cause another to think it true or false, we can only rely on analogous accepted truths to mimic or distort. That is what I meant by a third party. One may postulate a separate judgment (cultural, mathematical, lingusitic, mimetic) to aid the determination of a lie. Cheerskep does not allow a third party (like a jury) to reveal whether or not everyone, usually excepting himself, is philosophically, logically, linguistically muddled. Well, it's ok, whatever CVheerskep says because I'm convinced that beliefs trump all. We believe first, and then we reason. In fact, this is also in a way, the thesis of Hauser's book. He makes a claim for an intuitive moral sense by which we instantly know what is morally, ethically right or wrong through unconscious innate logic that is genetically determined. I think we can make an analogy between that and what we try to convey in language. Both sayer and hearer rely on an unconscious commonsense logic that greatly limits and sorts out likely meanings while still allowing for an infinite? variation and nuancing. WC
