Frances to Chris... The concept of iconicity as posited by Peirce is very much like the concept of imitation as posited by Worringer, except that iconicity is logically framed, while imitation is psychologically framed. Peirce however did allow a degree of psychology into logic, which subjectivism he held accounted for the initial desire that thinkers have toward finding truth in the first place, because it was claimed such a desire cannot be accounted for by logic alone, although the desire for truth was deemed to be very much a part of logic. The highest need and the greatest good for Peirce is furthermore the intellectual will to respect just law, which is best realized through logic. It is interesting for me to compare the theories of Peirce with those of Worringer and Aristotle, but my main curiosity here is whether Peirce was aware of the Worringer or Lipps concepts and read their writings.
Chris wrote... Worringer tells us that "it is necessary to agree on this, that the instinct of imitation, this elementary need of man, stands outside of aesthetics in the proper sense and that its satisfaction has in principle nothing to do with art." --- which he tells us "is created out of mankind's psychological needs, the highest happiness" Whereas Aristotle asserted that wrote that "to learn gives the liveliest pleasure, not only to philosophers but to men in general; whose capacity, however, of learning is more limited" -- and that is Aristotle's explanation for the universal pleasure felt in things imitated. So, it looks like what we have, here, is a profound difference of opinion. I'm inclined to agree with The Philosopher, because I'm really not sure how to draw the line between imitation and what Worringer calls "naturalism" or " the expression of organic vitality" And I'm doubting that Aristotle would have made that distinction, either. I.e. -- one sort of man (the ordinary kind - of limited knowledge) is pleased by an imitation of ordinary things, while another kind of man (the philosopher) is pleased by an imitation of things that only a philosopher might be able to notice.
