Michael writes: "I don't have a very clear notion of what concept you entertain when you write
> > notion > meaning > name > > What is a notion composed of? How does anyone (or you particularly) construct or form a notion?" First off, a good posting from Boris last month made me admit I confuse the discussion by using 'notion' in two different ways. First -- I use it as synonymous with "consciousness" ALL consciousness. E.g. as a dualist, I claim that "what there is" in the world can be divided into two different "kinds of things" material things, and consciousness. This alleged dichotomy has given philosophers trouble for two and half millennia. They have talked of consciousness as an "epiphenomenon" of the brain and its activity. To try to describe what they have in mind with "epiphenomenon", they use analogies not, note, as a PROOF of anything much, but merely in an attempt to convey their admittedly IIMT idea. They talk of light (consciousness) as distinguished from the bulb (material). They talk of the magnetic field (consciousness) as distinguished from the magnet (material). One of the prettiest analogies came, surprisingly, from Carl Jung. He cited a plate of hot spaghetti (material), and, above it, the small hovering cloud of steam (consciousness) that is distinctly not part of the spaghetti but would not be there without the spaghetti. It's questionable how helpful these analogies are when it comes to persuading anyone that there "is" such a thing as "consciousness". "Physicalists" claim it's a chimera, that people who think it's a "thing" are mistaken the brain tissue in your skull is all there "is". That throbbing neural node we see on a scanner "is" your pain, your "idea" of sin, entailment, cause, God, etc. Among the dualists there is a gang of "modal logicians", philosophers who ponder "possible worlds", or, phrase it, "conceivable worlds". For example, we can imagine the possibility which never became actual that the baby born in a Kentucky log cabin in 1809, the baby whose parents called him 'Abraham', might have died when he was four years old. He didn't, but he "could" have. These particular dualists say there is no inherent "IMpossibility" in imagining "consciousness" in a world WITHOUT any material entities. Note this is not an "empirical" question. What "is" the case e.g. that Abraham grew up to be the 16th American president does not obviate the "fact" that he COULD have died at four, but, luckily didn't. The point is that modal logicians use this observation - that we can conceive of consciousness without materiality - not just as part of an argument, but as part of the effort to convey what they have in mind when they talk of "consciousness" as distinguished from materiality. It proves nothing, but perhaps it helps their audience "get their idea" of "consciousness". And that last sentence demonstrates the second way I've used the word 'notion' to summon up not ALL of consciousness, but "a bit of" consciousness, a "particular" idea, attitude, feeling. This is troublesome thinking on my part. But it runs all through our language. "Money is the root of all evil." "What? You mean that eight dollars in my wallet is the root of all evil?" Earlier I cited the recurrent sloppiness in thinking that obtains because the same "word" is often used for a verb and a noun: 'fight', 'link'. The use of the same word for the "generic" and the "specific" 'money', 'notion' -- usually works in the kitchen, but it can fuzz up philosophy. I hope that gives a somewhat clearer notion of the "concept I have entertained" when I've said 'notion'. But, when I've talked of a particular notion or concept, I'm in trouble, because they are as IIMT as consciousness as a whole. It's misleading of me to talk of "my notion" of Abraham Lincoln, or of New York, or of the Red Sox, because what comes to mind each time I use the same word is never the exact same "bit of consciousness". Indeed, it's even misleading to use 'bit', because 'bit' suggests the "notion" is discrete, has perimeters, but it never does Again language misleads us: because the word, the label, is discrete and stable we think "the notion" behind it is too. But it never is. Language can be wonderfully serviceable, but it is always incomplete; in whole and in part the consciousness underlying our every use of language is indeterminate, indefinite, multiplex and transitory. That's enough for one posting. I'll get to 'meaning' and 'name' and "How does anyone (or you particularly) construct or form a notion?" later. Michael's posting: On Jul 31, 2010, at 4:17 PM, Michael Brady wrote: > Cheerskep > > In all these years of discussing thing with you (sequentially sending > electronic messages to each other's attention), I now realize that I don't > have a very clear notion of what concept you entertain when you write > > notion > meaning > name > > What is a notion composed of? How does anyone (or you particularly) construct > or form a notion? How do representations of external objects (a horsey, say, > or any other perceptible thing) stimulate a notion, and how does your thinking > or cognitive faculty establish a relationship between discrete stimulated > notions of a horsey and a foopgoom. In other words, how do you (or anyone) > establish the notions of relationships, such as causation, or modals such as > possibility, or the subjunctive, a probationary contradiction? > > I don't think you've ever addressed this. You have only offered us your son's > horsey, the Andean sheepherd's incomprehension of English, and foopgoom. > > Unless I have misunderstood what you meant previously. <g> > > By the way, you take Wittgenstein to task for writing, "But what does this > mean?"--in particular, his use of "mean." But that's the English translation. > What does it say in the original German? > > >> From all of which, and more, I infer Imago doesn't follow Wittgenstein any >> more than he follows me or Augustine. > > You switch between "you" and "Imago": Are you addressing Imago or merely > brushing him off in the third person? > > | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | > Michael Brady
