On Jul 31, 2010, at 6:00 PM, [email protected] wrote: > Aw, shoot, now, you know you can't mean that. Oh, I get it: You just want > me to hunt down my IIMT theory and post it again, and my description of a > dictionary definitions, and my speech about how "to have" is a chimerical > action, and my raves about the reifying impact of 'is', and my description of > the > four stages in an "act of art", and my. . .
You wrote back in 2008: "I have to figure out an effective, memorable way of saying this: Fuzziness is a matter of degree. Yes, all notion is to some degree fuzzy, and the words we use to convey something that's on our mind will always succeed only more less. (You may recall my mantra: All notions are IIMT -- indeterminate, indefinite, multiplex, and transitory.) BUT IT'S A MATTER OF DEGREE." I quickly glanced over several other messages from you that specifically discussed IIMT to some extent, and in all of them, you use this scheme to support your contention of the fuzziness of any notion. As you said in another message, I, I, M, and T are qualities, i.e., aspects of the notion. So, describe the coming into your awareness of a notion. (You know, "Sometimes a Great Notion," sometimes not. <g>) Does an array of synaptic activity produce a notion? If so, how do you, the person with the notion, become aware of that array of synaptic excitation? How can you produce synaptic "notions" that signify relationships, not things-in-the-world? | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Michael Brady
