Where does Harris claim that signs are only verbal? Nowhere I can find. wc
----- Original Message ---- From: Frances Kelly <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Sent: Fri, February 4, 2011 6:03:32 PM Subject: RE: Signs of Signs of Signs Frances to listers... In regard to their sign theories, that of Harris is close to that of Morris, but not to that of Peirce. Morris is a linguist and nominalist like Harris, while Peirce is a realist and logician unlike both of them. The further difference between the nominalist theories is that while Morris is a biotic behaviorist, Harris is an anthropic rationalist. Morris holds under a dyadic sign structure that all organisms are signers to the exclusion of nonorganic matter, but that only signs as signals are for all organisms and that only signs as symbols are for humans. Morris also holds that for all signers the habit of signs comes before the reason of signs. Harris holds under a monolithic sign structure that only and all humans are signers to the exclusion of nonhuman life and matter, and that signs are only verbal languages. Peirce holds that all mechanisms of matter and organisms of life are signs and signers to some degree. The realist theory of signs is useful, because it is global in its vast attempt to broadly account for all potential signs and all probable signers. The nominalist theory of signs is also useful, but only as a special theory of some signs and some signers. All of these sign theories however do hold in common that for anything to be felt or sensed and known as a sign it must be at least recognized initially by a normal human signer, who will simply be aware of the sign in the first place. Any objective world of signs without a sentient being to at least experience its very existence and presence would go unnoticed, and thus would be pointless and meaningless and useless. The nominalist theory of signs furthermore holds the logical inference of intelligent humans is as good as rational thought gets in the whole word. The realist theory of signs imposes no limits on signs or signers, even those yet to possibly be found. Peirce holds that linguistics with its languages is a practical science, and is not a theoretical science. Peirce further holds that linguistics is thus not required for semiotics or logics or mathematics, all of which he deems are theoretical sciences, and whose laws exist objectively in nature fully independent of the subjective human mind and its human languages. Peirce claims the mind of man finds natural laws with ordinary objects that act naturally as signs, but the mind does not make natural laws with signs. The agent of design found via signs for natural laws is inclined traits. The mind must use signs to stand for the stuff like laws that it senses. What is felt sensed in mind is the seeming haze of likely stuff guessed to exist in fact. Between the sense of mind and the stuff of fact is the haze of a sign. The sign represents stuff to mind as phenomena. The sign acts as a moderator. This is why mind cannot know exactly the true meaning of a sign, because mind must infer and interpret what the sign means. The sign imposes a limit on mind and what mind can know, and therefore a limit also on the human understanding of science. The sure real signs of semiotics and all effete minds and minds are thus degraded or degenerative versions of pure ideal logics and exact ideal mathematics. All organisms of life are conscious and are of mind to some degree, because they are all made of matter. Even mechanisms of matter are hence effete or weak mind that engages objects as signs of other objects and that hence engages in actions of quasi thought. The thought however is in the sign, and not in the mind of matter or life, although the sign of the thought can be in the mind. With these raw comparisons of mine in mind, the limits of nominalism become somewhat clearer for me. My slow deep read of Harris on signs and languages and communications however will continue in search of further insights.
