Yes, yes, yes, I concede to Cheerskep that nothing can BE an artwork but can only be called an artwork. I was not as precise as I ought to have been and I am a longtime champion of the disconnect between words and reality. Yet we project identities to everything. There is a door; there is the moon. etc. when in fact we are really saying there is something we usually call a door, etc. Some say that our naming things and pretending them to be the names we give them is indicative of the metaphoric nature of all language. I agree with that view (Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh). WC
----- Original Message ---- From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Sent: Sun, March 18, 2012 5:10:07 PM Subject: Re: descriptive / empirical aesthetics? In a message dated 3/17/12 7:54:56 PM, [email protected] writes: > "The fundamental starting point is to consider why something is > 'generally > agreed to be an artwork'." > I'd say there a number of factors that might persuade a large number of people to CALL an object an "artwork". That doesn't make it "BE" an artwork in any mind-independent ontic sense. (Query: Can you think of any object 'generally agreed to be an artwork' that has not been the occasion for an a.e. in large numbers of people? > "If all artworks are different then so are all > experiences of it. It is pointless to seek common features in the > so-called a.e. > when it's impossible to find any features in common to all artworks and > the > experiences of them." This is a non-sequitur for those who claim they > can get an a.e. from "real life" events. > "The only way to discover an empirical status for art is to > examine societal 'general agreement' about it." > > This sounds as though it may be tautological. The "empirical" "status AS > art is that a lot of people call a work so. > > "The intentionality notion as the indicator of an artwork is invalid > because it > can't be falsified." I agree that it's an "invalid indicator", but not > because it can't be verified. "Verifiability" is a bogus indicator of much at > all. Its biggest alleged use in the past century was as a standard for > "meaning". But hordes of philosophers pointed out many unverifiable beliefs > that were allegedly "meaningful". (My position is that there are no "meanings" > at all in the mind-independent world. But many utterances, many "words" > etc, occasion notion in lots of auditors. If they want to say those notions a > re "meanings" for them, okay, but realize a notion is not mind-independent. > > > I had earlier written: > > > My own plan, given world enough and time, would be to begin with aesthetic > experiences. I mean a.e.'s from various genres -- visual "art", music, > poetry, drama, dance. I start with the admittedly controversial premise > that an > a.e. is its own genus of experience, as distinctly its own as an olfactory > or > taste or tactile etc feeling. And I'd compare the a.e.'s from the > different > genres and see if I can justify calling them all a.e.'s. I'd ask what the > hell is going when I get them? Why do I get them from some works in a > given > genre, and not from other works? Then I'd try to compare the nature of the > a.e.'s from these so-called art genres with some seemingly comparable > feelings > from "real life". You would exclude any feelings from "natural" objects > and > events because the elements lack intentionality. I don't buy that. I'll > cartoon that position by saying I can have a terrific taste experience > from > something prepared by a chef, but also from something picked right from a > tree. > I claim I've seen drama on a sporting field, and in life-and-death events > being shown live on television. And so on. I know it's a project I'll > never > conclude.
