btransportationb, which is ba mechanism whereby narratives can affect
beliefsb If only this was useful in rush hour.
-----Original Message-----
From: Dominic McIver Lopes <[email protected]>
To: news <[email protected]>
Sent: Mon, May 6, 2013 11:03 am
Subject: [AE] Fwd: CfP: Art and the Nature of Belief
Begin forwarded message:
From: Art and Belief Conference <[email protected]>
Subject: CfP: Art and the Nature of Belief
Date: 6 May, 2013 03:59:19 PDT
Reply-To: Art and Belief Conference
<[email protected]>
Art and the Nature of Belief
11th-12th October 2013
Humanities Research Centre
University of York
Submissions of papers are invited for an international conference on
the topic of Art and the Nature of Belief.B
Invited Speakers
Gregory Currie & Anna Ichino (University of Nottingham)
Stacie Friend (Heythrop College)
Allan Hazlett (University of Edinburgh)
Eva-Maria Konrad (University of Regensburg)
Peter Lamarque (University of York)
Daniel Whiting (University of Southampton)
Conference Theme
The conference aims to bring together recent work on belief and its
connection to truth, with issues concerning belief that arise in
aesthetics. The question of whether we can arrive at truth, and indeed
gain knowledge, from engaging with artworks has received much attention
in aesthetics. However, much less has been said about the nature of the
beliefs formed as a result of engaging with art. It seems clear that at
least some of our experiences of artworks produce beliefs either about
the world more generally or beliefs about significant human concerns,
for example, moral, cultural, psychological, or political beliefs. In
the case of literature, this might be achieved through what has been
called btransportationb, which is ba mechanism whereby narratives can
affect beliefsb (Green and Brock 2000: bThe Role of Transportation in
the Persuasiveness of Public Narrativesb. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology. Vol. 79, No. 5, pp. 701-721, p. 701). If a reader is
sufficiently engaged in a story, bthey may show effects of the story on
their real-world beliefsb (Ibid). However, it is often the case that
the nature of the attitudes which arise out of transportative
experiences casts doubt on their belief status. They are for example,
unstable, that is, they are not retained by subjects. Nor do they look
like they are justified or reliable. On the basis of these features,
philosophers of mind working on the connection between belief and truth
may be inclined to take a non-doxastic approach to these attitudes.
Consequently, work done on this area may pose a considerable threat to
the idea that justified or reliable beliefs can be formed on the basis
of engaging with art.
Thus far belief theorists have had little to say about the sorts of
issues that arise out of beliefs formed on the basis of engaging with
art. But given that such beliefs do not always behave in the same way
as garden-variety beliefs, which are generally agreed to be necessarily
connected to truth, they present an interesting case to belief
theorists, and as such they demand attention. In light of all of this,
there is an opportunity for a significant philosophical interaction
between aestheticians and belief theorists that not only addresses
these issues but also illuminates the nature of belief for both parties.
This interaction presents the belief theorist with pertinent questions
regarding the status of beliefs formed as a result of engaging with art
and, in turn, demands philosophers of art to further consider the
relation between art and truth. This conference aims to address these
issues through a collaboration of philosophers working on belief and
aesthetics in the hope that this can illuminate the aesthetic cases
and, potentially, impact on our understanding of the nature of belief
itself.
Suitable topics/questions might include but are not limited to:
Are beliefs formed on the basis of engaging with artworks aimed at
truth or governed by a norm of truth?
Are some value-laden beliefs about artworks influenced by motivational
factors?B
Do beliefs formed on the basis of engaging with artworks exhibit
transparency to truth? Are they sensitive to evidence in the same way
or to the same degree as garden-variety beliefs?
Given that pictures need not represent the world accurately, how
reliable is a belief that is formed on the basis of pictorial
experience?
Why are we less able to form beliefs, or change our beliefs, on the
basis of aesthetic testimony? Does aesthetic testimony count as
evidence but has less weight than testimony in the ordinary case? Or
does aesthetic testimony not count for evidence for aesthetic beliefs
at all?
Submissions should be 2500-3000 words in length, starting with an
abstract of 200-300 words. Submissions should be prepared for blind
review, be in Word format, and sent [email protected] no later
thanFriday 19th July. Please include your name, institutional
affiliation, and title of your paper in the body of the email.
Papers will be double-blind reviewed. Notification will be sent out by
mid-August. Accepted speakers will have their registration and
accommodation for the duration of the conference paid, as well as
travel costs up to B#100.
The Mind Association has first refusal on an edited volume for their
Occasional Series published by Oxford University Press. After the
conference, a manuscript of the invited and submitted papers will be
submitted to OUP. Papers cannot be guaranteed publication, all will be
subject to the OUP refereeing process. B
Any queries should be sent to the conference organisers, Helen Bradley
and Ema Sullivan-Bissett, [email protected]. Further
information will soon be available on the conference
website:https://artbelief.wordpress.com/
Conference Support
The conference organisers gratefully acknowledge the generous support
of the Analysis Trust, the British Society of Aesthetics, and the Mind
Association._______________________________________________
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