Oy. The initial problem here is that the topic seems to assume that there IS a "THE nature of belief". There isn't. Ask twenty-five different people to articulate their notion of "belief", and you're likely to get twenty-five different descriptions of what they like to call "belief". And, indeed, they'll all be talking about NOTIONS. There is no mind-independent entity, "belief".
In a message dated 5/7/13 2:46:56 PM, [email protected] writes: > btransportationb, which is ba mechanism whereby narratives can > affect > beliefsb If only this was useful in rush hour. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Dominic McIver Lopes <[email protected]> > To: news <[email protected]> > Sent: Mon, May 6, 2013 11:03 am > Subject: [AE] Fwd: CfP: Art and the Nature of Belief > > Begin forwarded message: > From: Art and Belief Conference <[email protected]> > > Subject: CfP: Art and the Nature of Belief > > Date: 6 May, 2013 03:59:19 PDT > > Reply-To: Art and Belief Conference > <[email protected]> > > Art and the Nature of Belief > 11th-12th October 2013 > Humanities Research Centre > > University of York > > > Submissions of papers are invited for an international conference on > the topic of Art and the Nature of Belief.B > > > > Invited Speakers > > > Gregory Currie & Anna Ichino (University of Nottingham) > > > Stacie Friend (Heythrop College) > > > > > > > Allan Hazlett (University of Edinburgh) > > > > Eva-Maria Konrad (University of Regensburg) > > > Peter Lamarque (University of York) > > > > Daniel Whiting (University of Southampton) > > > > Conference Theme > > The conference aims to bring together recent work on belief and its > connection to truth, with issues concerning belief that arise in > aesthetics. The question of whether we can arrive at truth, and indeed > gain knowledge, from engaging with artworks has received much attention > in aesthetics. However, much less has been said about the nature of the > beliefs formed as a result of engaging with art. It seems clear that at > least some of our experiences of artworks produce beliefs either about > the world more generally or beliefs about significant human concerns, > for example, moral, cultural, psychological, or political beliefs. In > the case of literature, this might be achieved through what has been > called btransportationb, which is ba mechanism whereby narratives can > affect beliefsb (Green and Brock 2000: bThe Role of Transportation in > the Persuasiveness of Public Narrativesb. Journal of Personality and > Social Psychology. Vol. 79, No. 5, pp. 701-721, p. 701). If a reader is > sufficiently engaged in a story, bthey may show effects of the story on > their real-world beliefsb (Ibid). However, it is often the case that > the nature of the attitudes which arise out of transportative > experiences casts doubt on their belief status. They are for example, > unstable, that is, they are not retained by subjects. Nor do they look > like they are justified or reliable. On the basis of these features, > philosophers of mind working on the connection between belief and truth > may be inclined to take a non-doxastic approach to these attitudes. > Consequently, work done on this area may pose a considerable threat to > the idea that justified or reliable beliefs can be formed on the basis > of engaging with art. > > Thus far belief theorists have had little to say about the sorts of > issues that arise out of beliefs formed on the basis of engaging with > art. But given that such beliefs do not always behave in the same way > as garden-variety beliefs, which are generally agreed to be necessarily > connected to truth, they present an interesting case to belief > theorists, and as such they demand attention. In light of all of this, > there is an opportunity for a significant philosophical interaction > between aestheticians and belief theorists that not only addresses > these issues but also illuminates the nature of belief for both parties. > > This interaction presents the belief theorist with pertinent questions > regarding the status of beliefs formed as a result of engaging with art > > and, in turn, demands philosophers of art to further consider the > relation between art and truth. This conference aims to address these > issues through a collaboration of philosophers working on belief and > aesthetics in the hope that this can illuminate the aesthetic cases > and, potentially, impact on our understanding of the nature of belief > itself. > > > Suitable topics/questions might include but are not limited to: > > Are beliefs formed on the basis of engaging with artworks aimed at > truth or governed by a norm of truth? > > Are some value-laden beliefs about artworks influenced by motivational > factors?B > > Do beliefs formed on the basis of engaging with artworks exhibit > transparency to truth? Are they sensitive to evidence in the same way > or to the same degree as garden-variety beliefs? > > Given that pictures need not represent the world accurately, how > reliable is a belief that is formed on the basis of pictorial > experience? > > Why are we less able to form beliefs, or change our beliefs, on the > basis of aesthetic testimony? Does aesthetic testimony count as > evidence but has less weight than testimony in the ordinary case? Or > does aesthetic testimony not count for evidence for aesthetic beliefs > at all? > > > > Submissions should be 2500-3000 words in length, starting with an > abstract of 200-300 words. Submissions should be prepared for blind > review, be in Word format, and sent [email protected] no later > thanFriday 19th July. Please include your name, institutional > affiliation, and title of your paper in the body of the email. > > > Papers will be double-blind reviewed. Notification will be sent out by > mid-August. Accepted speakers will have their registration and > accommodation for the duration of the conference paid, as well as > travel costs up to B#100. > > The Mind Association has first refusal on an edited volume for their > Occasional Series published by Oxford University Press. After the > conference, a manuscript of the invited and submitted papers will be > submitted to OUP. Papers cannot be guaranteed publication, all will be > subject to the OUP refereeing process. B > > Any queries should be sent to the conference organisers, Helen Bradley > and Ema Sullivan-Bissett, [email protected]. Further > information will soon be available on the conference > website:https://artbelief.wordpress.com/ > > > > Conference Support > > The conference organisers gratefully acknowledge the generous support > of the Analysis Trust, the British Society of Aesthetics, and the Mind > Association._______________________________________________ > news mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.aesthetics-online.org/listinfo.cgi/news-aesthetics-online.org
