Good. Thanks.  Yes the change from emotional affect to formal and objective
analysis was central to the formation of the discipline.  That's why no one
ever mentions 'feeling' etc., in formal histor of art  lectures.   And that
means there's no discussion of aesthetics, either.

wc
________________________________
 From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
To: [email protected] 
Sent: Friday, December 6, 2013 7:17 PM
Subject: Re: comment invited
 

Johann Friedrich Christ (d1756)lectured on art
history  and envisioned
a book of all the painting styles organized by
stylistic periods.
Winckelmann seems to have confined himself to Greek and
Roman styles
and a linear schema,  which  were easier to organize and
understand.
Earlier ekphrasis seems to have more often  been an account of the
emotional  activity  of a work of art, rather than its physical
qualities.
This change  in emphasis  from the emotional tone of a work
of visual art to
the appearance of a work of art is interesting in
itself.

-----Original
Message-----
From: William Conger <[email protected]>
To: aesthetics-l
<[email protected]>
Sent: Thu, Dec 5, 2013 8:34 pm
Subject: Re:
comment invited

Yes, I agree that when we assume meanings as a shortcut we
are indeed
behaving
within a cultural paradigm or conforming to habits of a
group.

Before
Winkleman there were different ways to discuss artworks,
naturally.
But he
invented a system based on the style of forms, like
aesthetically
determined
formal  templates, I suppose, and he stipulated them
as the guides for
determining what's in and what's out as qualifying artworks.
That was
different from Vasari's notion of artistic celebrity.  Those forms
were
based
in antique Greek artworks.  Quite limited for us but it did
establish
the
working model for the new discipline of The History of Art (as
opposed
to,
say, presumed or proposed artworks in historical context or the
social
history
of art, etc.)

wc


________________________________
From:
"[email protected]"
<[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent:
Thursday, December
5, 2013 6:46 PM
Subject: Re: comment invited


I think that
if you intend to
describe"art history" as style then you need to
start earlier
than
Winckelmann. When William says that there are some things
which ?you
can?legitimately assume ?have a commonly accepted meaning he ought
to add-when
behaving as part of a social set.?










-----Original Message-----
From:
Cheerskep &lt;[email protected]&gt;
To: aesthetics-l
&lt;[email protected]&gt;
Sent: Thu, Dec 5, 2013 5:53 pm
Subject:
Re: comment invited




I glumly knew as I wrote my last that William would
find it "insufferable".
He's right when he maintains that he long ago asserted
that the term 'art'
has no "referent".   I maintain that what I said has
implications far beyond
the word 'art'. But that does not mean my observations
therefore can have
no further pertinence in aesthetics.

The very word
'aesthetic' -- especially in that awful term 'THE aesthetic'
-- is repeatedly
used with harmful blindness to fact that 'aesthetic' does
not "have a
meaning".   Moreover, this blindness obtains for the way language
is misused
in almost all areas of aesthetics. Philosophy of language and
philosophy of
art are often inextricable.

William says, "it's a shortcut mode of
communication to say such and such 'means' such and such.  Doing that
saves
time. It works; it's the Pavloffian part of civilization." I can't agree
with
him there. I do agree that it very often "works" -- in the kitchen, on a
playing field or a battlefield. We in the English-speaking world all
generally
tend to associate 'milk', 'run', 'shoot' with similar sensations.

But as we
get into more abstract discussions,   our assumption of
"meanings" works less
and less. 'Life', 'oppression', 'freedom', 'causation',
'meaning', 'same' --
these and other abstractions are the occasion for wildly
differrent conjured
notions. I've tried again and again on this forum to get
the
members to
address the fuzzy and dissimilar notions that arise with the term
'aesthetic
experience' -- and I've failed. Over the years, members have
continually used
the term and assumed that when they utter it their audience
of
course has the
same notion in mind as the utterer does.

Nor is my "dead horse" so dead as
William feels it is. It is as vivacious
as a wild stallion on the prairie in
aesthetics and all other areas of
experience. In colleges today, teachers
still assert that the "value" of a
story
lies in its "meaning": 'Man needs his
illusions. Jealousy is bad. You can't
recover the past, you can't escape the
past'. To me that seems clearly not
what should be drilled into students.
(E.g.   a million awful stories could be
said to "have" those "meanings".)
Here are some hints how these seemingly rarefied philosophical points
might
have "real life" impact:

When the Chief Justice of the United States was
required to address the
question of gay marriages, he sounded hesitant,
bothered. He worried the court
was being asked to "change the definition of
marriage". The most he could
have reasonably had in mind is the arbitrary
stipulated definition in the
Federal statutes. But if he thought he was
pondering "THE meaning of
marriage",
he should indeed have been worried.
Pro-life advocates assume the term 'life' has a determinate "meaning".
But
confusion reigns. They'd concede a difference between a "live" sperm
and a
dead sperm. But "by definition" that's not the "life" they want to
protect.
They don't feel comfortable accusing male masturbators of mass murder.

There
is no THE meaning (or even "THE definition") of 'marriage' or 'life'.
Or
'fair', 'insanity', 'human rights', or anything. So no legislature can
ever
frame a law that reflects some absolute, mind-independent,
"self-evident"
ontic law. We all want to believe "morally wrong" is just such
a
prevailing
verity of the universe. But it isn't. There's the mind's realm --
notional
entities; and the physical body's realm. But there's no third realm of
non-temporal, non-spatial abstract entities -- truths, facts, judgments,
"essences", "relations". All such abstractions are notional, products
of our
rambling brains at work.

Nevertheless legislatures can pass laws that,
arbitrary though they are,
can still be approvable by your brain, and mine,
and those of other
like-minded folk. The great challenge to a lawmaker is what
standard to choose
in
approving and disapproving. We both, I hope, are happy
there are laws -- and
law-enforcers -- against child-molesters, and those who
kill for the fun of
it.
But less happy remembering there were once arbitrary
stipulated laws
supporting slavery and denying women the vote.

I'm against
Pavlovian thinking in philosophy of art.

Enough for one insufferable
posting.

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