It seems like facebook is also getting slow.
-----Original Message----- From: "Travis Johnson" <t...@ida.net> To: af@afmug.com Date: 10/21/16 02:37 PM Subject: Re: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick This is still going right now... big and small websites and ISP's are unreachable and unresponsive. :( Travis On 10/21/2016 12:19 PM, Ken Hohhof wrote: Interesting, according to that, the ISP DNS servers are recruited as part of the attack on the victim's authoritative DNS servers, by sending queries from within the ISP's network. No spoofing, no amplification, no misconfigured DNS servers required, yet the ISP's DNS servers are used to send the attack traffic. All that is needed is a compromised IoT to send the query. From: Af [mailto:af-boun...@afmug.com] On Behalf Of Josh Baird Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 12:42 PM To: af@afmug.com Subject: Re: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick Right - crap IoT devices on the Mirai botnet were responsible for shoving 620+Gbps of traffic at Akamai to take down Krebs (and over 1Tbps to take down OVH). No spoofing involved. Interesting article on the techniques used by Mirai: https://f5.com/about-us/news/articles/mirai-the-iot-bot-that-took-down-krebs-and-launched-a-tbps-ddos-attack-on-ovh-21937 On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Ken Hohhof <af...@kwisp.com> wrote: The amplifier would receive a query from a spoofed IP address, and respond using a legit IP address. So the attacker needs to control some computers that can spoof the victim's IP address, but the actual attack traffic comes from the amplifiers using legit source IPs. In the case of IoT botnets, I'm not sure any spoofing is required. From: Af [mailto:af-boun...@afmug.com] On Behalf Of Josh Baird Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 12:21 PM To: af@afmug.com Subject: Re: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick It's a good start. It attempts to prevent spoofed traffic originating from your network to leave your network (or BCP38). On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 1:19 PM, Josh Luthman <j...@imaginenetworksllc.com> wrote: It can't be that simple...can it? Josh Luthman Office: 937-552-2340 Direct: 937-552-2343 1100 Wayne St Suite 1337 Troy, OH 45373 On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 1:17 PM, Mike Hammett <af...@ics-il.net> wrote: /ip firewall address-list add list="Public-IPs" address=x.x.x.x/yy disabled=no comment="My IPs" add list="Public-IPs" address=x.x.x.x/yy disabled=no comment="Downstream customer X IPs" /ip firewall filter add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop spoofed traffic" disabled=no out-interface="To-Upstream" dst-address-list=!"Public-IPs" That was largely composed off of the top of my head and typed on my phone, so it may not be completely accurate. You should also do it on customer-facing ports not allowing anything to come in, but that would be best approached once Mikrotik and the per interface setting for unicast reverse path filtering. You would then said customer facing interfaces to strict and all other interfaces to loose. They accepted the feature request, just haven't implemented it yet. ----- Mike Hammett Intelligent Computing Solutions Midwest Internet Exchange The Brothers WISP From: "Mike Hammett" <af...@ics-il.net> To: af@afmug.com Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 11:21:35 AM Subject: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick There's another large DDoS going on now. Go to this page to see if you can be used for UDP amplification (or other spoofing) attacks: https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/ Go to these pages for more longer term bad behavior monitoring: https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/ https://radar.qrator.net/ Maybe we need to start a database of ASNs WISPs are using and start naming and shaming them when they have bad actors on their network. This is serious, people. Take it seriously. ----- Mike Hammett Intelligent Computing Solutions Midwest Internet Exchange The Brothers WISP
