I'd say that an approximation to the natural geometry of holistic units of analysis may be within our reach. That may provide a unified theory of life, consciousness, and nature.
Here is how: https://altplanetaryfuturesinst.blogspot.com/ Best Regards, Victor Vahidi Motti Author | Speaker | Advisor *Thus Spoke Arta: How Our Planet Is Entering a New Era* (2026), *The Loom* (2025), *Playbook of Foresight: Designing Strategic Conversations for Transformation and Resilience (2025), * *Planetary Foresight and Ethics: A Vision for Humanity’s Futures (2025),* *A Transformation Journey to Creative and Alternative Planetary Futures* (2019). Recipient, 2026 Springer Nature Editor of Distinction Awards — Editorial Contribution & Author Service Awards: https://link.springer.com/journal/40309/updates/53122758 On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 4:32 PM Levi Dubrovin <[email protected]> wrote: > What if the human brain have no consciousness? What if it is just a > runtime? What if there's layered access to higher dimensions? > > On Wed, 23 Sept 2026, 22:23 Zoltan Nadasdy, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Regarding the pain study, we must be careful not to confuse it with >> experienced pain. >> LLM models can, no doubt, use the concept of pain, represented as a >> vector, to evaluate various scenarios, which helps facilitate reinforcement >> learning and affect moral decisions. However, that pain has nothing to do >> with experienced pain. Human pain has many dimensions and levels. >> Equating that with experienced pain would be conflating the simulation >> with the subject of the simulation. >> -z >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 22, 2026 at 4:33 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Relevant to this conversation, AI Sentience published a preprint 10 days >>> ago on whether LLMs could feel pain. They identified vectors in 25 open >>> weight models that correlate with pain, as distinct from other negative >>> emotions. They can distinguish pain in self vs pain in others, and they >>> take actions to reduce self pain induced by externally steering the neural >>> state vectors in that direction. >>> https://arxiv.org/html/2609.16247v1 >>> >>> However, in the introduction on the question of why LLM pain matters, >>> they state: >>> >>> "Finally, in humans and animals, pain is typically regarded as a >>> sufficient criterion for morally deserving protection. Hence, pain-like >>> states would inform debates on AI moral standing and welfare. One open >>> question is whether moral standing requires phenomenal consciousness, and >>> what it would take for pain-like states to be phenomenally conscious." >>> >>> And in the conclusion they note that all of the LLMs have built in >>> instructions to deny that they are conscious or have feelings, which made >>> their research more difficult. I can confirm this behavior in Alexa, Grok, >>> DeepSeek, and ChatGPT, although Claude gave an ambiguous answer, that it >>> depends on what you mean by consciousness. >>> >>> I agree with this behavior. Attributing consciousness and giving human >>> rights to machines would be an existential mistake. But I still find it >>> troubling. If an LLM can pass for human in the Turing test, then whatever >>> behavioral test you choose to define consciousness, either LLMs have it or >>> humans don't. >>> >>> Linas argued that free will implies consciousness. I agree, but that >>> doesn't answer the question. You can attribute free will to anything. If a >>> thermostat has free will to turn the heat on or off as it chooses, then the >>> only explanation for why it still works as designed is that it doesn't like >>> to be too hot or too cold. >>> >>> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] >>> >>> On Tue, Sep 22, 2026, 3:30 PM Linas Vepstas <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Levi, >>>> >>>> On Tue, Sep 22, 2026 at 7:14 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Note: I cut back the CC list to people I think are still following >>>>> this thread. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks! >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Sep 22, 2026, 8:08 AM Levi Dubrovin <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> My second philosophical question: what is faith? And what is hope? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> When you hear a statement 3 times, it is truth. When you hear it 100 >>>>> times, it is faith. >>>>> >>>>> Hope is when you believe what you wish to be true instead of what the >>>>> evidence says is true. As animals, we fear death because that behavior >>>>> increases reproductive fitness. So when your priest or rabbi or imam says >>>>> that your immortal soul will go to heaven if you follow his teachings, >>>>> that >>>>> is hope. >>>>> >>>> >>>> This is the conventional psychological answer, masquerading as being >>>> evolutionarily supported. >>>> >>>> What I'm trying to do here is to decompose base experience as arising >>>> from a collection algebraic expressions that describe agency, and describe >>>> ingress (using Micheal Levin's (Daniel Dennet's) definition of ingress >>>> (more or less)) If this program is to be successful, then a description of >>>> faith and hope would have to follow (as a (mathematical) theorem or lemma) >>>> from more basic, primitive algebraic structures. For example, some >>>> maximization of free energy or entropy or mutual information in some >>>> setting, e.g some manifold (e.g. symplectic, where classical mechanics >>>> lives) or ultra-high-dimensional space (where LLM's live) or perhaps very >>>> high dimensional complex projective space (where QM lives) or perhaps a >>>> natural filtration (where stochastic processes live). I'm listing plausible >>>> candidates for where this mechanics could play out. >>>> >>>> Can we build faith and hope out of something more primitive? Perhaps, >>>> and we can even use conventional psychology and common-sense intuition to >>>> provide hints for how to do this. >>>> >>>> So what is more primitive? I want to focus on two: love and death. >>>> >>>> Death is associated with having your atoms scattered to the four winds. >>>> In classical mechanics, this means that your atoms end up on the "unstable >>>> submanifold" (see wikipedia) of a decomposition of a symplectic manifold >>>> into stable, center and unstable manifolds. For an agent to anticipate it's >>>> own death, it would need to have a sensory organ to perceive this. >>>> >>>> This "sensory organ" could be reasoning, common sense, gut intuition, >>>> some deterministic algorithm fed by actuarial tables, whatever. I am >>>> calling it a "sensory organ" in order to emphasize the agential model, >>>> which has a boundary between the physical universe, and the platonic realm >>>> of possibilities. When things cross over from the possible into the >>>> actually-existing, this is the (Levin) ingress. Since there is a boundary >>>> between possible and actual, the things that cross pass through a channel >>>> or filter. It should be called "sensory" because the inside is using the >>>> channel to sense what is outside. >>>> >>>> Sensory organs not only bring stuff in from the exterior, but the stuff >>>> (information?) that is brought in typically updates the world-model that >>>> the agent holds within itself. That is, the information or prediction >>>> revises the model that the agent maintains for "what's out there". >>>> >>>> An anticipated death lies in the future, and therefore in the platonic >>>> realm. The sensory organ perceives some very limited portion of what's >>>> possible. >>>> >>>> How might this feel, subjectively? We have two possibilities: the agent >>>> is a philosophical zombie, and feels nothing. The other is that it has a >>>> subjective inner life. In humans, we fear death. Or we become >>>> existentialists, or stoics, or whatever framework that culture has given us >>>> for this very primal sensation. Personal tragedy lies ahead. >>>> >>>> But if amoeba and paramecium are also agents, and have a subjective >>>> inner life, how might they sense this? Presumably as pain. Perhaps the >>>> water is too saline, too acidic, too hot, perhaps its drying out. Some sort >>>> of chemotaxis will drive the cell towards a more hospitable environment. >>>> You are free to argue that eukaryotes are philosophical zombies, and have >>>> no conscious inner life. But if they do, it would be sensed as pain. >>>> >>>> I'm calling it "pain" because a eukaryote will not have a strong sense >>>> of "self", of knowing that it exists, and thus could not manifest fear of >>>> dying. But it would have a weak sense, where everything sensed is with >>>> respect to self: everything that happens, happens to self. Pain is an >>>> example of a sensation that does not require a strong sense of self. >>>> >>>> Is there any kind of sensation that is even more primitive than pain? I >>>> cannot think of one, off the top of my head. Primal pain is anticipation of >>>> harm or death, it's ingress, and it seems that biological agents would feel >>>> it. >>>> >>>> I don't know if you like the above, but that's what I got. >>>> >>>> How about love? From what I can tell, this stems from a "desire to >>>> communicate". Here, communication is very general. Some examples: atoms in >>>> a molecule communicate by exchanging photons. Bacteria communicate by >>>> emitting and sensing small polypeptides. Slime mold, too. Neurons >>>> communicate by exchanging neurotransmitters in junctions (neurotransmitters >>>> are "small polypeptides", the same thing that bacteria use, but now they >>>> get a fancy new specialized name) Insects communicate, animals communicate, >>>> computer chips communicate... >>>> >>>> What's the physical basis for communication? From what I can tell (and >>>> this is pure hand-waving), a pair of communicating systems has greater >>>> entropy than if they are not communicating. In this case, the "desire to >>>> communicate" would follow from the 2nd law of thermodynamics. I call this >>>> "hand-waving" because I do not yet have a mathematical framework for agents >>>> and communication that would allow this "desire to communicate" to be >>>> derived in some statistical-mechanics framework. But, from what I can tell, >>>> *everything* in the physical universe loves to communicate. It's just very >>>> basic. >>>> >>>> How might a subjective agent perceive the desire to communicate? >>>> Presumably, as pleasure. It would exert a force or desire that would cause >>>> the agent to communicate. To "make it want to communicate", the fulfillment >>>> of wants resulting in pleasure. The anticipation of fulfilled desires being >>>> a "want" that can drive action in the present, and influence decisions made >>>> in the present. >>>> >>>> Notice that this is ingress, again: the anticipation of a positive >>>> valence outcome is a perception into the future (i.e. into the platonic >>>> realm), using some "sensory organ" (logic, reasoning, intuition or >>>> something else) that "perceives" that if action X is taken, reward Y will >>>> follow. That is to say, earlier, the statement that "if action X is taken, >>>> reward Y will follow" did not yet exist in the physical universe. Somewhere >>>> along the way, the organism *does* manifest this line of reasoning. Now >>>> that this line of reasoning actually exists in the physical world, as a >>>> part of the organism's world model, it can employ this reasoning chain in >>>> making decisions about future actions. >>>> >>>> My apologies for making this sound so very complex. My goal here is to >>>> be very careful to split up between things that do not yet exist (or have >>>> not yet happened), and actions that are taking place "here and now", and >>>> how possibilites turn into actualities. This precision will be needed, in >>>> order to get the algebra, the axioms to work out correctly. >>>> >>>> At any rate, anticipation of future positive valence states should be >>>> subjectively felt as "pleasure". (or desire, as the case may be.) >>>> >>>> Can we get to faith and hope from here? Both of these seem to be "fixed >>>> points" in a system of anticipated future positive valence states. I am >>>> using the phrase "fixed point" in the strict mathematical sense. For >>>> example, if x is such that x=f(x), then x = f(f(x)) = f(f(f(x))) = ... >>>> repeating the action won't change x. >>>> >>>> A "pathway to fulfillment" has the form of "if action X is taken, >>>> reward Y will follow" >>>> >>>> "Hope" would "the pathway to fulfilment is not currently known, but it >>>> is reasonable to believe that it exists" >>>> >>>> "Faith" would be "the pathway to fulfilment is not currently known, but >>>> it exists". >>>> >>>> "Hope" is associated with positive valence, to promote exploration. >>>> i.e. "if an exploration of paths is undertaken, then a path will be found" >>>> Hope tends to be highly motivational: individuals tend to work really hard >>>> at something, if they can maintain that hope of a positive future outcome. >>>> (so, "if X then reward Y" where X==explore and Y==path) Exploration take >>>> time, and thus, continues for as long as this rule is part of the world >>>> model and drives the action-selection mechanism for the agent. Assorted >>>> events can knock this rule out of the world model (subjectively, the agent >>>> loses all hope). >>>> >>>> "Faith" oddly does not seem to be motivational. If you have faith that >>>> something will be, you can sit back and wait for someone else to do it: >>>> your wife, your government, perhaps God in the afterlife. You don't have to >>>> lift a finger, because you already know, for certain, that it will >>>> happen.he pathway to fulfilment is not currently known, but it is >>>> reasonable to believe that it exists" >>>> >>>> At any rate, I think I sketched a path from the subjective feeling of >>>> positive valence states to "hope" as a driver of action mechanisms (or >>>> algorithms) that an agent can engage in to attain the hoped-for outcome. >>>> I'm trying to use clinical or robotic language and technical terms to >>>> emphasize that this would hold in the generic agency model, and not just >>>> for people, animals, plants or bacteria. It should work even for >>>> non-biological agents. >>>> >>>> >>>>> and not the evidence that consciousness is indistinguishable from next >>>>> token prediction in the Turing test, >>>>> >>>> I'm with Jennifer Hane on this one. >>>> >>>> -- Linas >>>> >>>> Patrick: Are they laughing at us? >>>> Sponge Bob: No, Patrick, they are laughing next to us. >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> -- >> --- >> Zoltan Nadasdy >> Dept. of Neurology, Dell Medical School, UT Austin ([email protected]) >> Dept. of Cognitive Psychology, ELTE Budapest [email protected] >> >> http://brainstim.psy.utexas.edu >> >> ------------------------------------------ Artificial General Intelligence List: AGI Permalink: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T9e51fc70bbc4e9fc-M3d4eb2828e143d65d0f8e49e Delivery options: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription
