Bill Hibbard wrote:
Oh, well, in that case, I'll make my statement more formal:On Tue, 11 Feb 2003, Ben Goertzel wrote:Eliezer wrote:Interesting you should mention that. I recently read through Marcus Hutter's AIXI paper, and while Marcus Hutter has done valuable work on a formal definition of intelligence, it is not a solution of Friendliness (nor do I have any reason to believe Marcus Hutter intended it as one). In fact, as one who specializes in AI morality, I was immediately struck by two obvious-seeming conclusions on reading Marcus Hutter's formal definition of intelligence: 1) There is a class of physically realizable problems, which humans can solve easily for maximum reward, but which - as far as I can tell - AIXI cannot solve even in principle;I don't see this, nor do I believe it...I don't believe it either. Is this a reference to Penrose's argument based on Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem (which is wrong)?
There exists a physically realizable, humanly understandable challenge C on which a tl-bounded human outperforms AIXI-tl for humanly understandable reasons. Or even more formally, there exists a computable process P which, given either a tl-bounded uploaded human or an AIXI-tl, supplies the uploaded human with a greater reward as the result of strategically superior actions taken by the uploaded human.
:)
--
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky http://singinst.org/
Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence
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