Pei, my item b) is indeed the most thought-provoking.
Before delving into it, let me say that I'm clearly
not considering the level of detail introduced by
quantum computation. One of my premises is that brains
are "classical" devices where quantum processes are mostly
irrelevant (sure I'm aware that Penrose and Hameroff
would disagree).

I argue that a computer plus a body is not turing-like
because this system (both components together) is capable of
doing computation beyond what a tradicional turing machine could
do. Yes, I know this is quite a claim. Of course, a turing machine
could in principle receive sensory inputs from a body, and of
course it could command, for instance, its external arm in response
to this flow of information. But the question is that the action
associated with this input will produce a particular (and usually
unpredictable) set of feedback inputs. Think of a robot learning
how to coordinate its arm, and what happens when it grabs an
apple: all the dynamics of this arm will be altered and the only
way it can learn is to exercise it in a try/error fashion until
it grasps several invariances. Thus this system (computation plus
arm plus proprioceptive feedback signals) is very complex and cannot
be thought as a turing-like system, although one component of it
(the computer) can. All this is sound to me because of the
importance I give to the way adaptation builds perception
and vice-versa.

There are lots of researchers and philosophers who are confortable
with this position. Andy Clark's book (Being There) is an example,
but Alva Noe's book "Action in Perception" is even more to the point.
This is a quote from that book that makes the thing clearer:

  "...we ought to reject the idea - widespread both in philosophy
  and science - that perception is a process *in the brain* whereby
  the perceptual system constructs an *internal representation* of
  the world ... What perception is, however, is not a process in
  the brain, but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the
  animal as a whole"

This is a pungent thought that may be criticizable on some grounds,
but I see it carrying an important message that we should take into
consideration. If I had a little more time I would scratch the surface
of how all this influences cognition in general, and how one cannot
build an intelligent system without this kind of concern. For all
that, it is easy to see that my position is that a computer and
a robot are substantially different kinds of systems.

As a matter of fact, this may also shed some light on the kind of
criticism derived from Searle's chinese room, but let's not
resurrect that which is better left buried ;-)

Sergio Navega.





----- Original Message ----- From: "Pei Wang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, October 02, 2006 1:57 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Is a robot a Turing Machine?


Sergio,

I'm asking about your (b).

Put it in different words, my question is whether there is fundamental
difference between a robot and a conventional computer, such as my
laptop. I see that both you and Charles think there is a difference
(the sensorimotor capability), while Ben thinks there is no
theoretical difference, as far as the current discussion goes.

My own answer is the same as Ben's, though for a different reason ---
I'd rather not involve concepts like quantum Turing machine. Before
arguing for my position, I'd like to see what arguments are out there.
;-)

Pei


On 10/2/06, Sergio Navega <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: "Pei Wang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> We all know that, in a sense, every computer system (hardware plus
> software) can be abstractly described as a Turing machine.
>
> Can we say the same for every robot? Why?
>
> Reference to previous publications are also welcome.
>

That's a quite interesting question. Unfortunately, I don't
remember of any particular references (but I guess they might
exist). I classify this question in three steps:

a) The computational component of the robot
This is as close as one may get to a turing machine, of course
without enforcing the physically impossible infinite tape.

b) The computational plus the bodily component
(or just the bodily). Here we are not talking about turing-like
devices. Physical idiosyncrasies of the mechanical components
cannot be computed (it's a too complex problem).

c) The system robot plus its environment
This is as far of turing formalisms as one can get. And this is
the situation most AI systems will have to face.

Sergio Navega.



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