David...
On 11/29/06, David Hart <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On 11/30/06, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Richard,
>
> This is certainly true, and is why in Novamente we use a goal stack
> only as one aspect of cognitive control...
Ben,
Could you elaborate for the list some of the nuances between [explicit]
cognitive control and [implicit] cognitive bias, either theoretically or
within Novamente?
David
Well, there is nothing too obscure in the way explicit
goal-achievement dynamics and implicit goal-achievement dynamics
co-exist in Novamente...
Quite simply, in the NM system as it is now (and as it is planned to
be in the reasonably near future), explicit goal achievement is one
among many dynamics. There are also many "ambient" cognitive
processes that the system just does "because that's the way it was
created." These include a certain level of reasoning, concept
formation, procedure learning, etc.
It is anticipated that ultimately, once a NM system becomes
sufficiently advanced, explicit goal-achievement may be allowed to
extend across all aspects of the system. But this does not make sense
initially for the reason Richard Loosemore pointed out: A baby does
not have the knowledge to reason "If I don't act nice to my mommy, I
may be neglected and and die, therefore I should be nice to my mommy
because it is a subgoal of my supergoal of staying alive." It doesn't
have the knowledge to figure out precisely how to be nice to its mommy
either. Instead, a baby needs to be preprogrammed with the desire to
be nice to its mommy, and with specific behaviors along these lines.
A lot of preprogrammed stuff -- including preprogrammed **learning
dynamics** -- seem to be necessary to get a realistic mind to the
level where it can achieve complex goals with a reasonable degree of
flexibility and effectiveness.
-- Ben
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