You are right in what you say about (1). The truth is, my analysis is
meant to apply to NARS operating with unrestricted time and memory
resources (which of course is not the point of NARS!). So, the
question is whether NARS approaches a probability calculation as it is
given more time to use all its data.

As for higher values... NARS and PLN may be using them for the purpose
you mention, but that is not the purpose I am giving them in my
analysis! In my analysis, I am simply trying to justify the deductions
allowed in NARS in a probabilistic way. Higher-order probabilities are
potentially useful here because of the way you sum evidence. Simply
put, it is as if NARS purposefully ignores the distinction between
different probability levels, so that a NARS frequency is also a
frequency-of-frequencies and frequency-of-frequency-of frequencies and
so on, all the way up.

The simple way of dealing with this is to say that it is wrong, and
results from a confusion of similar-looking mathematical entities.
But, to some extent, it is intuitive: I should not care too much in
normal reasoning which "level" of inheritance I'm using when I say
that a truck is a type of vehicle. So the question is, can this be
justified probabilistically? I think I can give a very tentative
"yes".

--Abram

On Sat, Sep 20, 2008 at 9:38 PM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 20, 2008 at 9:09 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>>
>>> (1) In probability theory, an event E has a constant probability P(E)
>>> (which can be unknown). Given the assumption of insufficient knowledge
>>> and resources, in NARS P(A-->B) would change over time, when more and
>>> more evidence is taken into account. This process cannot be treated as
>>> conditioning, because, among other things, the system can neither
>>> explicitly list all evidence as condition, nor update the probability
>>> of all statements in the system for each piece of new evidence (so as
>>> to treat all background knowledge as a default condition).
>>> Consequently, at any moment P(A-->B) and P(B-->C) may be based on
>>> different, though unspecified, data, so it is invalid to use them in a
>>> rule to calculate the "probability" of A-->C --- probability theory
>>> does not allow cross-distribution probability calculation.
>>
>> This is not a problem the way I set things up. The likelihood of a
>> statement is welcome to change over time, as the evidence changes.
>
> If each of them is changed independently, you don't have a single
> probability distribution anymore, but a bunch of them. In the above
> case, you don't really have P(A-->B) and P(B-->C), but P_307(A-->B)
> and P_409(B-->C). How can you use two probability values together if
> they come from different distributions?
>
>>> (2) For the same reason, in NARS a statement might get different
>>> "probability" attached, when derived from different evidence.
>>> Probability theory does not have a general rule to handle
>>> inconsistency within a probability distribution.
>>
>> The same statement holds for PLN, right?
>
> Yes. Ben proposed a solution, which I won't comment until I see all
> the details in the PLN book.
>
>>> The first half is fine, but the second isn't. As the previous example
>>> shows, in NARS a high Confidence does implies that the Frequency value
>>> is a good summary of evidence, but a low Confidence does implies that
>>> the Frequency is bad, just that it is not very stable.
>>
>> But I'm not talking about confidence when I say "higher". I'm talking
>> about the system of levels I defined, for which it is perfectly OK.
>
> Yes, but the whole purpose of adding another value is to handle
> inconsistency and belief revision. Higher-order probability is
> mathematically sound, but won't do this work.
>
> Think about a concrete example: if from one source the system gets
> P(A-->B) = 0.9, and P(P(A-->B) = 0.9) = 0.5, while from another source
> P(A-->B) = 0.2, and P(P(A-->B) = 0.2) = 0.7, then what will be the
> conclusion when the two sources are considered together?
>
> Pei
>
>
> -------------------------------------------
> agi
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