On Tue, 24 Feb 2009, Ed Murphy wrote:
> Detail: http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=2376
>
> ============================== CFJ 2376 ==============================
> It is possible for a Rule to change a proposal's text.
Judgement:
First, it is trivially TRUE that the Rules could be altered at high level
to allow this. However, in the spirit of dealing with the Rules at the
time of the CFJ (rather than dealing with all hypothetical rulesets),
I'll write the opinion towards a narrower question that I suspect was
intended by the Caller: "It is possible for a clause to be added to a
Rule (and no other changes be made) that would allow a Rule to change a
proposal's text."
In the Ruleset at the time of the CFJ, the definition of a proposal and
how it is to be submitted was contained in R106/15; the question is whether
this definition or submission process makes the text inherently immutable.
The previous arguments (gratuitous and otherwise) for this case and for
Appeal 2376a have made it clear that in common or legislative processes,
proposals can be mutable or immutable; in legislative processes in
particular, mutability is defined by the existence of a mutation process.
In a gratuitous argument, I stated:
- The process of R106, and of Agoran Decisions, does suggest, rather
strongly, immutability;
- The history of the process also strongly suggests immutability;
However, neither the general R106/15 description of what a proposal "is",
nor the explicit submission process in R106, nor the historical context,
contain explicit Rules-based definitions of immutability. Therefore, using
the guidance of R754/9(2), if a clause were added to a rule *of the same
power as R106/15* that declared a proposal mutable, *or* contained an
explicit process of mutability, it would define the mutability without
contradicting R106. This, again leads to TRUE.
So what if a lower-powered rule defined a mutability process? By
Rule 754/9(4), "In determining the ordinary-language meaning of a term,
definitions contained in lower-powered Rules, followed by definitions
used in contracts or other Agoran legal documents, SHOULD be used for
guidance."
The question is, how strong is this guidance? Rule 754 has been
specifically re-written to allow common definitions of words in higher-
powered rules (e.g. "proposal") to have higher authority than lower-
powered definitions. If common dictionaries clearly and directly linked
"proposals" to "immutable text", that definition would win. However,
in this case, as discussed at length, the common definition of "proposal"
does not forbid mutability and some legislative systems allow it.
Further, while the "weak suggestions" and "historical context" do in
fact suggest immutability, it is not at this point for the good of
the game to disregard the guidance of the SHOULD in R754; rather, in
the name of respecting process, a well-specified power-1 mechanism for
altering a proposal should not be taken as conflicting with R106/15.
Again, this leads to a judgement of TRUE.
Therefore, with a finding of TRUE on any reading of the CFJ in question,
this Court finds TRUE. HOWEVER: it is important to note that this
decision does *not* address, nor is it meant to imply an opinion on, what
happens to an Agoran Decision to *adopt* a proposal if the proposal
text changes after the initiation of a Decision to adopt it.
Also note, that if we accept that a Proposal text can be changed, it goes
against the precedent that "any body of text (such as a rule) conforming
to the first paragraph of R106 is a proposal" because this latter
precedent coupled with mutability would imply that a proposal, when it
changes it text, actually turns into a copy of a previously-existing
platonic proposal and so is no longer its own proposal. But that's
another matter for philosophers to moot on another day.
-Goethe
