On 5/27/23 13:40, Forest Sweeney via agora-business wrote:
> So: this sentence is written poorly based on current Agoran culture and
> tradition. There are three primary ways to read this sentence atomically.
> The first is that the "it" in the sentence refers to "that rice plan". A
> rice plan is not an action. Thus, it makes no sense to be consenting to a
> non-action, and this is unreasonable to assume.
>
> The second is that the "it" in the sentence refers to "that rice plan has
> that player's Signature." However, this is a state of something: how can we
> consent to a state of affairs? However, similar to previous examples, we
> DON'T consent to states of affairs: we don't consent to whether sex
> happened, but rather, whether it is going to happen, and we don't consent
> to contracts, but rather what the contract will do.
>
> Thus, we reach that third interpretation: we are consenting to that rice
> plan obtaining or not obtaining your signature. You consent to the change,
> the action that occurs, or you reaffirm consent that inaction is
> acceptable: that no change is acceptable. (It is not strictly necessary to
> reaffirm consent to Inaction, but you can say no or yes to something many
> times if you'd like to get your point across. Note that inaction can be
> interpreted as an action in of itself. EG this is how tardiness works: we
> don't apply the blots to Time, we apply the blots to the player.)
I remain confused about how this interpretation can be reached from the
text. You're just asserting that it can be without providing any reasoning.
Can you please be explicit about which of the following you think is the
case:
* R2519 explicitly or implicitly governs "consent" to states of affairs.
* R2519 does not explicitly or implicitly govern "consent" to states
of affairs. Under the natural language meaning, "consent" to a state
of affairs is meaningful and evaluates consent with respect to the
state of affairs coming to be or ceasing to be, and consent to those
changes is governed under R2519.
* R2519 does not explicitly or implicitly govern "consent" to states
of affairs. Under the natural language meaning, "consent" to a state
of affairs is meaningful and evaluates consent with respect to the
state of affairs coming to be or ceasing to be, and consent to those
changes is governed under the natural language meaning of "consent".
* Something else?
Yes, this distinction does matter.
Also, I again raise the point that the R2519 definition applying
directly to states of affairs doesn't make sense, especially item 3. And
pleading that item 4 saves it doesn't make sense; R2519 explicitly
includes text about promises, and if promises always made it "reasonably
clear" that the creator wanted something to happen, it wouldn't need
that text.
Further, consider the promise "I become a signatory to [some rice plan],
but I explicitly do not consent to any future changes or states of
affairs.". If this is cashed, to the extent that the player actually
does become a signatory to the rice plan, e consents to it. However, it
is abundantly clear that item 4 of R2519 would not apply in the future.
How is consent for the rice plan to be continuously evaluated?
> Now: with regard to "is consenting to it". This is the final nail we should
> hammer down. What does it mean to be consenting to something? In R2519,
> consent is treated like an action in clauses 1 through 3. However, in
> clause 4, we see some of the natural language definitions appear. This
> makes consent work in most reasonable situations if it could otherwise not
> work. However, most of the consent presented for rice plans currently falls
> under clause 1: we publicly agree to rice plans. If there's any concern
> about whether we have consented to rice plans, then we can also apply
> clause 4: it has been reasonably clear that we assented to said rice plans.
R2519's item 4 still explicitly refers to "the action". It's not
different from the other items in the list in that respect, and you
can't wave your hand to say "it makes everything Just Work" when the
text doesn't say that.
> The full process goes like this for consenting to rice plans, and the
> signatures being applied:
> 1. A player consents to a rice plan.
> 2. The signature is added to the rice plan, as the player consented to this
> step in 1.
> 3. That player does nothing with regard to that rice plan.
> 4. The player is already consenting to that rice plan having that signature
> (under clause 4 of R2519), so the signature is not removed. If for some
> reason, the signature was removed, then the signature would be added back
> to the rice plan, as the player has already indicated reasonably and
> clearly that e would like that to occur (again, clause 4 of R2519).
> 5. That player consents to that rice plan (again).
> 6. If for some reason, the signature was removed, then the signature is
> added to the rice plan, otherwise, the rice plan already has the signature
> and no change to consent to occurs, and this is fine. The player has now
> indicated reasonably and clearly that e'd like the signature to be added, a
> second time, and this violates no rules.
> (similar steps occur for withdrawal of consent.)
I echo G.'s concern that there's no textual basis for evaluating
withdrawal of consent.
> Finally, to close this case: in general, as a point of law, clear public
> attempts to consent work. The Ricemaster Report is reasonable evidence for
> who tried to consent, and since I'm [for independent logical reasons]
> judging that clear attempts work, we can assume the ones in the report
> worked.
The Ricemastor included consent by contract. Can you please explicitly
provide reasoning for why consent by contract does or does not work, and
what language in the contract does or does not work?
--
Janet Cobb
Assessor, Rulekeepor, Stonemason
