Michael Slone wrote:
>                                   but an executor with the power to
>     perform an action

The power to perform what action?

>     Executorship of an entity that is not a natural person can be
>     granted or revoked by the action of a proposal with power as
>     great as that of this rule.  Executorship of a natural person
>     can be granted or revoked only as explicitly authorised by the
>     rules.

... including by a rule with Power=1?  I'm dubious about allowing anyone
else to be executor for a natural person.

>     Whenever one entity gains executorship of another entity, each
>     executor of the former entity simultaneously gains executorship
>     of each executee of the latter entity.

Isn't this implied by the transitivity requirement?

>     Whenever one entity loses executorship of another entity, each
>     executor of the former entity simultaneously loses executorship
>     of each executee of the latter entity.

What if they were executor of such an entity by some other route?
I think you need to split executorship into mandated executorship,
which is not transitive, and implied executorship, which is implied by
mandated executorship and is transitive and reflexive.  You can then
speak of gaining or losing *mandated* executorship, and the implied
executorships just work themselves out.

Actually, I spot a problem with transitive executorships.  Suppose A is
explicitly executor of B, and B is explicitly executor for C, so A is
implicitly executor for C.  Suppose further that A is prohibited from
acting on B's behalf except to submit proposals.  By your rules A is then
allowed to act on C's behalf, even though A is not permitted to exercise
executorship of C on B's behalf.  To resolve this you probably need to
drop transitive executorship altogether, and require explicit chaining.

>     Whenever an entity attempts to perform an action but does not
>     communicate clear intent to perform the action on behalf of
>     another entity, e shall be presumed to be attempting to perform
>     the action directly.

Not a good presumption, I think.

>Grant executorship of the Pineapple Partnership to Goethe and Zefram.
>
>Grant executorship of Human Point Two to Murphy and Quazie.

The partnerships define their own means for the partners to act on
their behalf.  Don't need executorships for this.

>     A natural person who is not currently registered and is not
>     prohibited from registering is permitted to register.  No other
>     entity can register.

I'm opposed to ending the partnership experiment at this point.
We haven't nearly explored what partnerships could achieve as players.

Anyway, this is irrelevant to executorship.  If you want to restrict
playerhood then (a) do it in a separate proposal, and (b) don't
grandfather the existing partnerships.

-zefram

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