On Mon, Mar 9, 2009 at 4:04 PM, Kerim Aydin <ke...@u.washington.edu> wrote:
> Ah, this helps. It answers ais523's CFJ as well, perhaps. Judge Woggle
> said that a "SHALL", once the time limit has passed, becomes an "open-ended
> obligation". Which means that if (a) the Officer doesn't do it on time
> and (b) the Deputy does it then (c) the Officer is *still* required and
> able to do it (a second time after the deputy does). Though the Officer
> has no time limit on doing so (and so can't be punished - therefore this
> new open-ended obligation doesn't violate R101vi).
For reference:
{
Judge woggle's Arguments:
The caller's arguments suggest that "strict literalism" suggest that
we must interpret the "ASAP SHALL ... by announcement" as "ASAP (SHALL
and CAN) ... by announcement". Fortunately, this is not really true
when we have to read in the "CAN", since strict literalism can't give
us actual bounds on how often the CAN is permitted. (In fact, strict
literalism would say SHALL but CANNOT, which precedent has apparently
already rejected.) In the interest of the deputization rules working
and the tradition that they apparently do work, it is reasonable to
interpret the end of the extent as open-ended when the obligation is
not properly fulfilled in time. There is, however, no compelling
reason to interpret it as open-ended in the opposite direction.
Therefore, I judge CFJ 2120 TRUE and CFJ 2121 FALSE.
}
You're taking the arguments out of context. The word 'open-ended' is
referring to the end of the extent to which the late obligated is
still able to perform the action, not anything about further
obligations. While your argument is reasonable, woggle's arguments
don't support it, I think.
