Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com> wrote:
> It's not quite that.
> We sell X's. We cannot control how the X's are used. But if they are
> used without calling home to our MASA, we cannot certify that they are
> genuine X's. They might be counterfeit X's.
Or, they might be genuine X's running trojaned's software.
The fact that between leaving seller A and buyer C, they were activated by
attacker M will be in the MASA's audit log, if buyer C looks.
{Can attacker M replace software via serial console without leaving a trace?
Not BRSKI's problem exactly, but it's certainly a concern}
> BRSKI is a way of proving that the X announcing its identity as X12345
> really is the one and only X12345.
> If you sell it to someone who doesn't care about that, they can use it
> anyway.
Depending upon the software in X, you may be able to hook up a craft/serial
console and just configure it the way you want, just like you do today.
Or it might be some new-fangled SDN switch that won't operate with a
controller attached, and it doesn't even have a serial console. Nothing I
can do will change that.
--
] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh networks [
] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | network architect [
] m...@sandelman.ca http://www.sandelman.ca/ | ruby on rails [
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