On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 5:49 AM Eliot Lear <l...@cisco.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 23 Jun 2020, at 14:01, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> I don’t know if the group looked at this, but I can say that from a
>> public CA standpoint, it’s not much different from otherName because there
>> is a requirement to validate the name.  A new URI scheme would require a
>> new resolution mechanism.  Perhaps that is needed as part of ACP *anyway*.
>> The one value of URI is that it is easier to configure in some of the
>> tooling like OpenSSL.
>>
>> What disturbs me about all of this is that public CAs will accept
>> otherNames and produce garbage out.  That’s just asking for a boot to the
>> head* from a vulnerability perspective.
>>
>
> This would at present appear to violate the BRs. S 7.1.4.2.1 says:
>
> Contents: This extension MUST contain at least one entry. Each entry MUST
> be either a dNSName containing the Fully-Qualified Domain Name or an
> iPAddress containing the IP address of a server. The CA MUST confirm that
> the Applicant controls the Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address or has
> been granted the right to use it by the Domain Name Registrant or IP
> address assignee, as appropriate.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> Oh it does the DV. It just adds garbage into the cert :-(
>

I'm talking about the second sentence, which requires that the SAN contain
only dNSName or IPAddress.

-Ekr
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