Thanks, Esko
inline
On Wed, Sep 21, 2022 at 10:52:47AM +0000, Esko Dijk wrote:
> Thanks,
>
> One item I forgot to include which was also on my mind - a security
> consideration. If an autonomous bootstrap method like BRSKI is left
> "always-on" in a mesh network, it means that at any time an off-mesh attacker
> can contact its nearby Join Proxies and flood them with traffic. E.g. using
> different LL addresses to pretend it is multiple Pledges.
> This will cause relayed traffic on the mesh, potentially overloading it.
>
> * One solution component is clearly rate-limiting of relayed traffic. But,
> this is not even mentioned in the security considerations. And not in 8995 as
> far as I can tell.
For the stateful proxy, the pull request from my review i sent last friday
suggests the
following text:
To protect itself and the Registrar against malfunctioning Pledges
and or denial of service attacks, the join proxy SHOULD limit the
number of simultaneous mapping states for each IP_p%IF to 2 and the
number of simultaneous mapping states per interface to 10. When
mapping state can not be built, the proxy SHOULD return an ICMP error
(1), "Destination Port Unreachable" message with code (1),
"Communication with destination administratively prohibited".
Do you think these are useful numbers ?
The whole idea of the stateless proxy is of course to remove the need for
intellegence
from the proxy and only have it on the registrar. The best DoS protection i
could
think of on the proxy is therefore just a total packet rate limiter. Is it
possible
to come up with good recommendations on such packet rate limiters ? For example
1% of the "uplink" bitrate ? Can you think of mesh networks where this would not
be a good enough number ? If this (or another number) makes sense we could
suggest
to add it to the stateless proxy section.
> * Another solution component is being able (by an admin) to "turn on" and
> "turn off" the entire option of BRSKI bootstrapping. This could also be
> mentioned as a security advice: turn it off when not needed i.e. when the
> operator knows for sure there are no new Pledges to be bootstrapped. The
> method of "turning on/off" could be implementation-specific as we don't
> define any APIs for control of Join Proxies. The intended behavior of any
> Join Proxy is then as follows:
> 1. If BRSKI is "on", respond to discovery requests by Pledges as usual and
> do relay any (DTLS) records they may send to the join-port.
> 2. If BRSKI is "off" , don't respond to discovery requests by Pledges and
> don't relay any data sent to the join-port. (Effectively, close it.)
If the proxy does not discover a registrar, then of course it can not forward
enrolment
requests. We should at least specify that proxies need to correctly support that
registrar (announcemenets) are switched on/off. What do you think ?
> Some networks may have a "BRSKI always on" policy because it's needed for
> their application and for convenience, but for a majority of networks I
> expect that isn't needed.
I can already see a BRSKI scenario in the USA, where the manager of the
east-coast NOC went home at
5PM and some IT folks on the west coast still want enroll new equipment in an
installation and
wonder what happens.
But if this is what customers want (and i think you say some of them likely
will want this), then i would
like to see appropriate disagnostics for the local installer:
Instead of stopping service announcements (registrar and proxy), i would then
love to see the service
announcements witth some "service status" flag/field. For example "off hours"
or the like. Workflow:
Device to be enrolled has single color LED. You connect it (west coast) to the
network, and it would
indicate "off hours" through eg.: repeating three short blinks. This validates
that network connectivity
works, and that enrolment will proceed once someone switches "BRSKI on" (next
morning).
Does that make sense ?
> Maybe such practical security related solutions are already described in
> other documents e.g. 6TiSCH joining or GRASP documents but unfortunately I
> didn't read enough of those documents to know this. If so we can also refer
> to it as security consideration.
> For a mesh network, avoiding an outsider to be able to "load" the mesh links
> with random data is especially important.
Indeed. Hopefully the #state and rate limiters proposed above would be
sufficient to get past
this point ?
Cheers
Toerless
>
> Regards
> Esko
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Richardson <m...@sandelman.ca>
> Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2022 12:31
> To: Esko Dijk <esko.d...@iotconsultancy.nl>
> Cc: Anima WG <anima@ietf.org>; anima-cha...@ietf.org; stokcons
> <stokc...@bbhmail.nl>
> Subject: Re: [Anima] 2nd WGLC for draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy-12,
> ends September 20th 2022
>
> Okay, thank you. I'll crunch through your comments on Friday.
--
---
t...@cs.fau.de
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