Carsten Bormann <c...@tzi.org> wrote:
>> the manufacturer has all the golden values (the endorsements).
> The manufacturer may have the reference measurements. Whether anyone
> whose statements you are willing to base your authorization on is
> willing to endorse the manufacturer’s claims is one of the
> authorization questions hidden in attestation…
If your point is that other entities may have reference
measurements/endorsements then I agree. But so what?
RFC9334 says that the RP (the Registrar) needs a policy as to whose
Attestation Results to trust, so that needs to be considered.
If you want a choice in verifier, you have it.
There is some latent fear among some people that the *Manufacturer* can only
be the factory in Shenzhou, and we can't trust them. Of course, we went to
some effort to say, MASA, not Manufacturer.
But, I wonder if there are some linguistic thing occuring with the word
Manufacturer that gets it confused with "factory".
iPhones are manufacturered by Apple, even if the Factory is Foxcon.
OEM = Original Equipment Manufacturer, which to my mind, is the entity that
holds the private key corresponding to the firmware signing trust anchor.
Anyway, *A* reason that I haven't written up an EAT-in-Voucher ID is that
I've been convinced that devices need continuous assurance, and it makes no
sense to me to run a remote attestation once in BRSKI, and then again in a
continuous form. I think just run the continuous assurance protocol, but
OTH, it would be nice to do this before the device is accepting onto the
network.
--
Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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