Dear WG, 

I've read the proposal and the discussion that has been posted in the last 
couple of days. 

In the current form, I would like to state that I wouldn't support the 
proposal. 

I would like to give some history about BGP hijacks and specifically 2 that 
have been widely published (at least in the Netherlands for 1 in particular..) 
and another one after people found out via Wikileaks (Hacking Team 
involvement). 

The first one was when Bulgarian spammers hijacked IP space of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands..  for more than 10 days.. without the Dutch 
ministry noticing .. BTW. Spamhaus did .. and listed their prefixes along with 
other prefixes from the hijackers. 
The ministry stated the IP space wasn't in use or announced .. at least not 
announced in BGP by them ..  
After the hijack came to surface, a Dutch national newspaper published a story 
about it.. and questions to the responsible minister were asked how / why / who 
was responsible / why didn't anyone notice etc etc. 

https://www.volkskrant.nl/wetenschap/ip-adressen-ministerie-gekaapt-door-bulgaren~b75ad982/
  ( Dutch article ) 
https://tweakers.net/nieuws/104975/ip-adressen-buza-gekaapt-via-bgp-hijacking.html
  ( Dutch tech site article ) 

The official reaction to Dutch parliament was, that it was too hard to 
prosecute or even find the actual people behind the hijack and they decided not 
to go after them. 
While in fact there was the option to request the administrative information 
known at the RIPE NCC and the AMS-IX where they consumed services and had 
payment details and perhaps even more (both are Dutch entities and required to 
provide the information when asked by the Dutch authorities).   
But perhaps it was just not important enough to look into it and request the 
Bulgarian government to hand over some of their citizens.... as the Dutch 
government might needed the Bulgarian assistance in 2014/2015 during the 
refugee influx and their support in the EU.  #politics 

Even IF they would have proceeded .. under Dutch law, BGP Hijacking isn't a 
criminal offence and as a result, not directly illegal or criminal.. 
Performing a (D)DOS or breaking into a computer system is.. but BGP hijacking 
as such isn't.   Especially if the IP space wasn't in use.. so nothing broke or 
stopped working .. 

So even if they would get the Bulgarian spammer/hijackers in front of a Dutch 
judge .. the change was that ... they would walk, because there was no harm 
done .. No law was broken, no system invaded and nothing stopped working . . . 

( Full disclosure I'm not a lawyer, but this is the information that I was 
handed at the time.. )  

The Dutch cyber prosecutor wasn't even sure under which section of the Dutch 
Criminal law (Strafrecht) this might fall and he suggested 'perhaps .. Art. 161 
sexies Sr - https://twitter.com/Byte_Fighter/status/625012729171025920 ) 
That can be found here :  (in Dutch ) 
https://maxius.nl/wetboek-van-strafrecht/artikel161sexies 

Where it mentions ( He who deliberately destroys, damages or disables any 
automated telecommunications work, causes a disturbance in the workings or 
operation of such work, or defeats a safety measure taken in relation to such 
work, shall be punished: ) - * Google Translate translation...  

The other version of a quite known BGP Hijack is the one of Hacking Team, who 
acted on behalf of the Italian government (Police) to re-activate a RAT Command 
and Controll server after a bulletproof hoster (Santrex) went down.  
And that particular C&C was important enough to regain control over,  as it was 
part of an active operation of the ROS.  ( 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raggruppamento_Operativo_Speciale ) 

More insight on that BGP Hijack - 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/07/hacking-team-orchestrated-brazen-bgp-hack-to-hijack-ips-it-didnt-own/
 

So in this case, the Italian Police (ROS) used (forced??) an Italian ISP to 
hijack some IP space to regain control of their lost RAT C&C server.. (endpoint 
for RAT infected machines.) This wasn't an accident .. but was it criminal by 
the ISP to assist their local police ? 
And what would have been the impact if they didn't . . ? 

These are your/our tax dollars at work ...  They either don't care or are the 
bad actor themselves.

So the customers that hold an SSA or End-User Agreement (PI Holders for IP 
space and AS number) look to be the 'target' of the policy, however that leaves 
out the legacy resource holders..  
And with the current transfer policies in place, yes it is possible to obtain a 
legacy AS number and a legacy IPv4 prefix ...for yourself .. and those can't be 
'retrieved' with this policy .. And even with the policy, it isn't the RIPE NCC 
that COULD de-register them as they are not allocated by the RIPE NCC in the 
first place ... 
So Legacy holders (resources with a legacy status) are for obvious reasons, 
excluded for penalties and out of reach. Also according to the policy that 
specifies services to Legacy holders, as this policy doesn't state that it 
wants to include and impact legacy holders.  

The biggest issue what I see in this policy, is that the RIPE NCC ( either 
themselves or the Exec Board. ) is desired / aimed to pull the trigger on a 
membership or contractual relationship. 
This is huge no no imho. These kind of actions or decisions should be kept out 
of the RIPE NCC office and the actual case and decision should be made by a 
court and court order. 
If the RIPE NCC would like to stay neutral, it can't be the executor or be held 
liable for any decisions like this, handed to them (even by an external 
'expert' ) on these matters. 
If someone likes to make the case that someone is in violation, there should be 
a neutral judge that should review the case and the accuser can go to the RIPE 
NCC with the result .. And the RIPE NCC will just execute based on the outcome. 

Handing those kind of decisions to the RIPE NCC or the Exec Board is a sliding 
scale .. and open to scope creep.  I would be very careful with what we are 
wishing for ..  

I can understand the sentiment or intent of the policy, but I'm against any 
form of policy where the RIPE NCC or the Exec Board will be involved in the 
actual decision like this as it will impact their neutral status and the fact 
they are opening themselves for liability claims. 

Again I'm not a lawyer, but I have huge concerns about this. 

Kind regards,
Erik Bais 

- Sorry for the long read..  - 

On 19/03/2019, 13:41, "anti-abuse-wg on behalf of Marco Schmidt" 
<anti-abuse-wg-boun...@ripe.net on behalf of mschm...@ripe.net> wrote:

    Dear colleagues,
    
    A new RIPE Policy proposal, 2019-03, "BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy 
Violation", is now available for discussion.
    
    The goal of this proposal is to define that BGP hijacking is not accepted 
as normal practice within the RIPE NCC service region.
    
    You can find the full proposal at:
    https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03
    
    As per the RIPE Policy Development Process (PDP), the purpose of this 
four-week Discussion Phase is to discuss the proposal and provide feedback to 
the proposer.
    
    At the end of the Discussion Phase, the proposers, with the agreement of 
the Anti-Abuse WG co-chairs, decide how to proceed with the proposal.
    
    We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to 
<anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net> before 17 April 2019.
    
    Kind regards,
    
    Marco Schmidt
    Policy Officer
    RIPE NCC 
    
    Sent via RIPE Forum -- https://www.ripe.net/participate/mail/forum
    
    

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