http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LB04Ad01.html


Asia Times
February 3, 2010


US's strike threat catches China off guard 
By Peter J Brown 


-"[T]he more interesting question - 'Could conventional forces hold at risk 
China's nuclear forces?' - is something that seems to be just settling in." 
-US submarines carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles, bombers carrying the same 
type of cruise missiles, along with UAVs such as Reapers and soon perhaps 
stealthy US aircraft carrier-based UAVs, might be tapped to conduct C-PGS 
strikes....
-The Russians comprehend the inherent ambiguity in the US initiative, and they 
quickly became the most vocal and adamant opponents of C-PGS in general.


The United States plans to unveil later this decade a new conventional Prompt 
Global Strike (C-PGS) system. It will enable the US to instantly carry out a 
massive conventional attack anywhere in the world in an hour or less. 

Research and development work by the US Department of Defense (DoD) on C-PGS 
began almost two decades ago, and this shifted into high gear in 2003. Instead 
of delivering a nuclear warhead, a new US-based missile and/or some other 
unmanned delivery vehicle may carry a conventional warhead that is able to 
destroy a distant target in less than an hour. 

The DoD issued the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on February 1 - which 
is mandated by the US Congress. It specifically mentions C-PGS prototypes as 
well as other "long-range strike" capabilities. 

"The US cannot take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in 
the programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that dominance's 
persistence," wrote US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a commentary 
accompanying the 2010 QDR entitled, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the 
Pentagon For a New Age". 

"In the case of China, Beijing's investments in cyberwarfare, anti-satellite 
warfare, anti-aircraft and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic 
missiles could threaten the United States' primary means to project its power 
and help its allies in the Pacific: bases, air and sea assets, and the networks 
that support them. This will put a premium on the United States' ability to 
strike from over the horizon and employ missile defenses and will require 
shifts from short-range to longer-range systems, such as the next-generation 
bomber." 

Gates struck a balance, however, later in his commentary. 

"We should be modest about what military force can accomplish and what 
technology can accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, information, and 
satellite technologies have led to extraordinary gains in what the US military 
can do," Gates wrote. "The Taliban were dispatched within three months; Saddam 
[Hussein]'s regime was toppled in three weeks. A button can be pushed in 
Nevada, and seconds later a pickup truck will explode in Mosul. A bomb dropped 
from the sky can destroy a targeted house while leaving the one next to it 
intact." 

How best to address the C-PGS program is proving to be a tricky subject for 
China because there is considerable uncertainty surrounding it. 

"It's an emerging realization. I don't think the Chinese have fully come to 
grips with it," said Dr Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and 
Nonproliferation Initiative at the Washington DC-based New America Foundation. 
"At some level, the Chinese see the US as investing in precision conventional 
munitions and have made their own parallel investments. But the more 
interesting question - 'Could conventional forces hold at risk China's nuclear 
forces?' - is something that seems to be just settling in." 

One senior US policy analyst wonders whether this has China both confused and 
concerned about the program. 

"Confused because I don't think anyone could explain to them what [C-PGS] 
entailed and perhaps still cannot with any fidelity, and concerned because it 
is seen as another aspect of American hegemony and space domination plans, and 
because it potentially changes US nuclear strategy in unanticipated and perhaps 
undesirable ways," said this analyst. 

Lewis points to a recent meeting, a so-called US-China Track II exchange, 
involving many US and Chinese participants, which demonstrated how the Chinese 
may have been caught off guard by the way in which C-PGS has suddenly appeared 
on their radar screen. 
....
"It seems likely that Chinese defense planners will coalesce around the idea 
that the US is undertaking an open-ended strategic modernization which focuses 
largely on missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities, and that 
China needs to continue to improve the survivability of nuclear forces, largely 
through mobility, and continue to investigate ways to disrupt US command, 
control and intelligence capabilities," said Lewis. 

It is best not to rule anything out when addressing the topic of C-PGS because 
there are so many variables involved, and so many possible outcomes as well. A 
report by the Washington, DC-based Center for Defense Information in 2008 - "An 
Examination of the Pentagon’s Prompt Global Strike Program: Rationale, 
Implementation, and Risks" - concluded, among other things, that: 

"[W]eapon systems developed in pursuit of a PGS capability could raise the 
probability of an inadvertent nuclear exchange and complicate future arms 
control negotiations. Accordingly, the ramifications of a PGS capability must 
be considered within the context of US arms control, nonproliferation and 
nuclear safety objectives. Only then will policy-makers and Congress be able 
make informed assessments of the potential advantages, risks and tradeoffs of 
PGS...."

For years, several DoD-funded C-PGS projects have proceeded, including the 
Falcon Hypersonic Test Vehicle (HTV), the Blackswift hypersonic aircraft, the 
X-51 scramjet-powered vehicle, and the Conventional Strike Missile, or CSM, 
which is a modified Minuteman III ballistic missile, to name a few. The US Air 
Force (USAF) Research Laboratory, the USAF Space and Missile Center, and the US 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency oversee this activity. 

CSM is the definite frontrunner as the C-PGS development effort unfolds. US 
defense giant Lockheed Martin, which plays a central role in the 
satellite-based US Global Positioning System (GPS) that supports global 
positioning, navigation, and timing, is also a lead contractor for C-PGS. 

In late December, the DoD announced that Lockheed Martin was awarded just over 
US$16 million "for all design elements through the preliminary design review. 
Lockheed Martin shall design, fabricate, integrate and test payload delivery 
vehicle for flight demonstration for the [C-PGS] capability." 
....
It is quite likely that CSM will be based at Vandenberg Air Force Base in 
California and fall directly under the command of the US Strategic Command 
rather than the new USAF Global Strike Command. 

USAF General Kevin Chilton, head of the US Strategic Command, recently said 
that a C-PGS deployment by 2016 is a "reasonable objective" and yet "he wanted 
to see a first [CSM] missile on alert, with two spares, before the end of 2012" 
[1] 
....
US submarines carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles, bombers carrying the same type 
of cruise missiles, along with UAVs such as Reapers and soon perhaps stealthy 
US aircraft carrier-based UAVs, might be tapped to conduct C-PGS strikes....

C-PGS fits quite neatly into President Barack Obama's "Global Zero" plan to 
create a nuclear-free world. Still, the 2010 QDR will only prompt opponents of 
C-PGS to speak out more loudly. 

Consider what Alexei Arbatov, a scholar in residence at the Carnegie Moscow 
Center, stated at a recent conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace: 

"There are very few countries in the world that are afraid of American nuclear 
weapons. But there are many countries that are afraid of American conventional 
weapons. In particular, nuclear weapons states like China and Russia are 
primarily concerned about growing American conventional, precision-guided, 
long-range capability, [or C-PGS] systems." [2] 

The Russians comprehend the inherent ambiguity in the US initiative, and they 
quickly became the most vocal and adamant opponents of C-PGS in general. It was 
the strong message from Russia that helped to cancel out the Trident in terms 
of any C-PGS role after the Russians argued successfully that it would be 
virtually impossible for them to discern quickly whether a long-range missile 
fired from a US submarine was carrying a nuclear or a conventional warhead. 

Russia may brand CSM as an unwelcome spin off of Trident in this regard. 

Now that China has terminated all military-to-military exchanges as a result of 
the US decision to proceed with arms sales to Taiwan, many important issues 
including C-PGS will probably not be addressed at all in the coming 
months....China in past discussions with the US on nuclear weapons and nuclear 
disarmament has often alluded to the need for the US to be more mindful of the 
overall superiority of its conventional firepower. 

Whether or not China and the US are talking, Japan is proceeding with the 
launch of its Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). The emergence of the QZSS 
satellite constellation coupled with the recent approval by the Diet 
(parliament) of Japan's New Basic Law for Space Utilization - which opens the 
door for Japan's military space programs - are two important and related 
developments which China is watching closely. 

QZSS works closely in tandem with the US GPS System, for example. It is 
designed to vastly improve the overall accuracy and availability of 
satellite-based positioning, navigation and timing information in Japan and 
East Asia as well as, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia and Australia. 

Both QZSS and the Basic Law involve their own inherent element of ambiguity. 
While both impact commercial activities in Japan, both could influence the 
shape and scope of future joint US-Japanese military programs as well the US 
C-PGS program. 

Plans call for the four QZSS monitoring stations in Japan - these are in 
Hokkaido, Koganei, Ogasawara and Okinawa - to be joined by five other QZSS 
monitoring stations in India, Hawaii, Guam, Thailand and Australia. QZSS 
signals are easily accessed over the entire Korean peninsula as well and do not 
require ground stations there. 

While Japan prefers to promote the vast array of commercial and civilian 
applications of QZSS technology, the military applications cannot be 
overlooked. QZSS is tied directly to the US GPS satellites, and China is 
certainly aware of this link. Could QZSS pose a threat to China? This seems 
entirely feasible. 
....
China remains confused and concerned in the process, and perhaps believes that 
the US C-PGS program may already exist under another name. The lack of clarity 
that surrounds this program may make it quite difficult for Beijing and Moscow 
to figure out exactly what the US is up to here....

Notes:

1.) US Military Eyes Fielding 'Prompt Global Strike' Weapon by 2015, July 1, 
2009, globalsecuritywire.org. 2.) Russian Experts Question Role of Conventional 
'Prompt Global Strike' Weapons, April 7, 2009, nti.org. 

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