Robin Hanson wrote:
> To me the central issue is instead human meta-rationality. If cognitive
> errors make workers sometimes miss-estimate the safety of a job, but
> workers realize that they might make such errors, then wiser-than-thou
> academics just need to *tell* workers that their particular job is
> more or less safe than they realize, and that should fix the problem.
> If people have time-inconsistent preferences, but realize this fact,
> then it can be enough to give them means to commit to future choices.
> If people can neglect possible ways a contract can go bad, but realize
> this fact, they can give arbitrators discretion to deal with this when
> settling contract disputes.
>
> In contrast, those who see large policy implications from imperfect
> reasoning tend to assume that people are not meta-rational. This may
> be true, but most of the evidence presented just show cognitive errors,
> and is silent on the issue of meta-rationality.
I think the reason they ignore it is that they think it is too
far-fetched to be worthwhile studying. Have you got any empirical
evidence to overcome that burden of proof?
One thing that interests me: You might call my notion of "rational
irrationality" a form of meta-rationality. But my model doesn't imply
that you can make people compensate for their irrationality by pointing
it out to them; the only thing that works is raising price of error.
--
Prof. Bryan Caplan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/bcaplan
"We may be dissatisfied with television for two quite different
reasons: because our set does not work, or because we dislike
the program we are receiving. Similarly, we may be dissatisfied
with ourselves for two quite different reasons: because our body
does not work (bodily illness), or because we dislike our
conduct (mental illness)."
--Thomas Szasz, *The Untamed Tongue*
