In a message dated 8/26/02 6:33:51 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
<< There are several levels of puzzlement. Puzzle #1: The median voter disapproves of existing policy. Puzzle #2: The median voter, primary voters, and party activists ALL disapprove of existing policy. I don't think there are many good examples of #1. There are even fewer good examples of #2. Can you think of any? So what are you getting at? Since there is a series of elections, each with a different median voter, the MVT doesn't actually predict that the median general voter gets his way? Or what? >> During the 1990s large supermajorities of American voters indicated a preference for Congressional term limits, while large supermajorities of representatives and senators opposed term limits. At the same time, however, voters often reelected their own representatives and senators, suggesting that perhaps the appeal of term limits came from the notion of getting rid of someone else's representative. I'm not familiar with the median voter theorem, but perhaps the median voter in Mass wanted term limits to get rid of Jesse Helms, while the median voter in NC almost certainly wanted term limits to get rid of Ted Kennedy. (I recall, however, that most of the support for term limits came from the political right, so perhaps something else entirely contributed to the appeal of term limits, in which case it would serve as a good example of an issue on which policy different substantially from what the median voter wanted.) David Levenstam