Dear Armchairs, A question has been bothering me for sometime. The question involves the hypothetical scenario as follows. (I am new on this list and I hope I have posed the problem in a clear way):
Let’s assume that the advertisement behavior during elections of political parties in a ‘two party’ system can be modeled by a tit-for-tat strategy. The parties have the option to engage in either *positive* advertisement or *negative* advertisement. Positive advertisement involves only highlighting the ‘good’ aspects of oneself, whereas negative advertising involves only highlighting the 'deficiencies' of the other party. If one party uses negative advertising, the other party will do the same and it will become the dominant strategy for all elections. Such a situation is generally not socially beneficial because many people are so put off by negative advertisement that they choose not to vote. Let’s assume that this hypothetical political system is stuck in a situation where the two parties are engaged in negative advertisements and the voters are becoming increasingly frustrated with the system. Now suppose that a *viable and credible* third party enters the race (this party has a realistic chance of winning). The first move of this party is to use positive advertisement. Does economic theory say anything about what would happen next? Should the two original parties continue with negative advertisement or switch to positive advertisement (a switch that is socially beneficial). If the first two ignore the positive advertisement of the third party, will the third party soon decide that its dominant strategy is to use negative advertisement? Can someone clarify this situation for me or direct me to material that may help answer this question? Thanks Arham Choudhury __________________________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail Plus - Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now. http://mailplus.yahoo.com