Everyone,
Just to be clear about the Remedy environment and passwords:
1) There are absolutely NO backdoor passwords that are used for system access
that
are not visible and under the control of the Administrator.
2) Since about 7.0, we have REQUIRED that you supply a password for the system
users -- Remedy Application Password, DSO (there is no password for
Escalator)
3) Yes, there is a default Database password to get started -- and you are
encouraged to change it immediately.
4) Yes, there is a default user installed (Demo) to give a starting point -- and
you are encouraged to change it or delete this user immediately (and all of
the
installers have been corrected for several years now to not look for a user
named Demo)
So, there are no secret back doors to the system that would provide access and
there are only two cases where there is even a temporary default password -- if
WE
create the DB, we need to do something and then you change it and this can be
worked around if you create the DB and give us the information AND the Demo
user
that is loaded to give you initial access into the system (you have to get in
somehow the first time).
Again, if you have not changed either of the two passwords noted here, you
should
do that immediately and on every system. Otherwise, there is no issue within
the
product around this topic.
Now, there are a bunch of other security settings that I encourage you to use --
-- restrict where run processes can run processes
-- control the shell under which processes can run
-- use the password management feature to enforce password rules
-- use the feature that disables an account after x bad password attempts
(and make x a relatively small number like 5 or at most 10)
-- disallow blank passwords (except for AREA cross-reference situations)
-- and a number of other things
We encrypt passwords on the wire. We in fact default encrypt the entire traffic
on the wire (with higher levels of encryption than the default available if
desired). We use a connectionless protocol with user validation at every call
to
ensure that you are who you say you are to prevent piggybacking connections.
Remedy should not be vulnerable to attack of the kind described unless you have
opened your systems to the outside and have not followed suggestions of changing
the to key initial passwords (I would consider changing the DB name from ARAdmin
as well just to make it that much harder to find -- and that is fully
supported).
Doug Mueller
-----Original Message-----
From: Action Request System discussion list(ARSList)
[mailto:arslist@ARSLIST.ORG] On Behalf Of Pierson, Shawn
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2014 5:31 AM
To: arslist@ARSLIST.ORG
Subject: Re: Target Attack and BMC Software ITSM?
I read the article and clicked on the link to the Krebs on security site.
Based on that site, which may or may not be correct, it's saying that the
potential BMC product is BMC Performance Assurance Agent. Since this isn't a
part of Remedy I really have no idea how it works and if there is a back door
or if it was installed and they forgot to change a default password.
In any case, it's not Remedy, so that's a good thing.
Thanks,
Shawn Pierson
Remedy Developer | Energy Transfer
-----Original Message-----
From: Action Request System discussion list(ARSList)
[mailto:arslist@ARSLIST.ORG] On Behalf Of Jeff Lockemy
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2014 7:23 AM
To: arslist@ARSLIST.ORG
Subject: OT: Target Attack and BMC Software ITSM?
This news article hit today...
http://www.startribune.com/business/242688511.html
It says that a default password in a BMC ITSM product may have contributed to
the target attack.
Jeff
Jeff Lockemy
Lead Engineer, NAVY 311
Enterprise Service Management PMW-240
ITIL V3 Foundation Certified
QMX Support Services Inc.
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