"Postponing peace as a possible strategy is seen to be mostly used by the Government in dealing with separatist rebel outfits rather than with groups seeking a solution within the ambit of the Constitution. Separatist groups too doesn't seem to dislike this strategy. That perhaps explains as to why both New Delhi and the Assam Government could clinch a deal with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) relatively quickly because the Bodo rebel group was clear right from its inception that it was seeking a solution within the Indian Constitutional framework."
Postponing peace as a strategy by different players in a conflict appears to have become a norm. This, perhaps, is because by keeping on postponing the advent of peace-players engaged in a particular conflict, be it the concerned non-state actor or the Government — seeks to gain time and utilise it to analyse the intent of the other side or simply adopt a wait-and-watch approach in the absence of any clue on how to move forward.
Take the case of the North-east: There are many instances of insurgent groups and the Government engaged in peace talks of stretching the dialogue to an indefinite period of time, often meeting to discuss one single issue again and again and not making any progress whatsoever. The point to take careful note of is that these players could actually be keen on delaying the progress in the peace process because of an unsure end result.
Peace talks with the NSCN(IM) began in 1997 after a ceasefire agreement was clinched between the rebel group and the Government of India. The teething trouble was over the interlocutor from New Delhi's side. Finally, that was settled as former Union Home Secretary K Padmanabhiah came to be acceptable, and has more or less succeeded in striking a rapport with the NSCN(IM) leaders. Today, after 40 rounds of talks, the two sides are still talking about the ceasefire extension issue and worried over whether the truce would be extended any further or not. Obviously, without a truce in place, the talks cannot proceed.
Then, without any clarification from either side as to whether the NSCN(IM) has given up its demand for an independent Naga homeland, the two sides, or at least the NSCN(IM), have given more than clear indications that the rebels were bargaining for an integration of the Naga inhabited areas in the North-east into the State of Nagaland in lieu of an independent homeland.
Yes, the advent of peace must be postponed, the players seem to conclude! The rival NSCN(K) is already accusing the NSCN(IM) of compromising on the Nagas' dream of having an independent homeland. Concerned players must, therefore, wait-and-watch!
So, we see the introduction of a new player by New Delhi in the form of Union Minister Oscar Fernandez, who is meant to be the 'political face' in the peace process. He regaled the Naga rebel leaders in Bangkok last month by playing the mouth organ. But, that had not helped to generate an assurance from the NSCN(IM) leadership that the truce would be automatically extended after it expires (yet again) on January 31.
Therefore, Fernandez is going to Bangkok again within the next few days to talk just that: extension of the truce. Other things can follow only after that!
Postponing peace as a possible strategy is seen to be mostly used by the Government in dealing with separatist rebel outfits rather than with groups seeking a solution within the ambit of the Constitution. Separatist groups too doesn't seem to dislike this strategy. That perhaps explains as to why both New Delhi and the Assam Government could clinch a deal with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) relatively quickly because the Bodo rebel group was clear right from its inception that it was seeking a solution within the Indian Constitutional framework.
That brings the focus on the current status of the peace process between the outlawed ULFA and New Delhi.
It was in November 2004 that writer Mamoni Raisom Goswami assumed the role of a peace 'facilitator', a move endorsed by the ULFA. That itself was a breakthrough of sorts because she became the first person to have been accepted by the ULFA in a peace facilitator's role. It took a year for this to translate into something more concrete, like the formation of the People's Consultative Group (PCG) by the ULFA. Goswami, during the year until the PCG came into being, was engaged in exchanging letters with the Prime Minister's Office. The content of the PMO's letters took months to be politically correct from the ULFA's point of view.
Now, more than two and a half months after the first round of talks between the PCG and the PMO, there is no news as to the exact dates for the next round of talks. The process has to be delayed, that seems to be the strategy! One doesn't know how long the PGC-Delhi talks go on before direct talks are held, if at all, between the Government and the ULFA. Already, the ULFA has demanded that unless New Delhi releases its detained leaders (many of whom central committee members of the outfit), they group cannot decide on holding direct talks with the Government.
Chances are bright that the advent of possible peace on the ULFA front too is going to be postponed for any number of reasons. But, going by precedence, postponing peace deliberately is not really a good strategy, both for the Government as well as for groups engaged in any armed or unarmed movement. That, after all, takes the steam out of any movement besides making the authorities strike a deal that do not really solve a problem. Often, such problems re-emerges in a new avatar. (feedback: [EMAIL PROTECTED])
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