Very well said Baruah. Was surprised to all heck that the Telegraph decided to publish your analysis :-).
Best, m At 5:50 PM -0500 2/19/06, Sanjib Baruah wrote: >http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060220/asp/opinion/story_5850159.asp > >The Telegraph (Calcutta) Monday, February 20, 2006 > >HOW THE STALEMATE MACHINE WORKS > >Sanjib Baruah > >The obvious lesson of Kakopathar is that counter-insurgency operations and >negotiations towards peace do not go together, writes Sanjib Baruah The >author is at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and Bard College, >Annandale-on-Hudson, New York > >The developments in Assam over the past few days have made one thing >clear: that reports in recent years of the United Liberation Front of >Assam losing influence have been highly exaggerated. At least that is not >the case in those parts of rural upper Assam the home ground of ULFAs >exiled top leadership and the site of the recent unrest. > >For a number of days, pro-ULFA slogans and sentiments have been in open >display as villagers of the Kakopathar region blocked a national highway, >stormed army pickets, vandalized vehicles and even dug up the highway to >protest against the custodial killing of a fellow villager by the Indian >army. That the army describes the victim as an ULFA hit-man has had no >effect on the publics sense of outrage. Nine persons were killed in a >police firing of protesters. ULFA called an Assam bandh on February 13, >protesting against the Kakopathar firing and its chairman, Arabinda >Rajkhowa, compared the incident with the Jalianwalla Bagh massacre. > >The backdrop to these developments might initially seem awkward. The >second meeting between the government of India and the ULFA-appointed >peoples consultative group had just taken place in Delhi where the >government even promised confidence-building measures to facilitate what >could some day be called a peace process. However, important differences >exist on the government side on whether to negotiate with ULFA. No less a >person than Assams governor, Lieutenant General Ajai Singh architect of >two counter-insurgency operations against ULFA publicly opposes >negotiations. What is there to negotiate with them? he asks. Instead, he >favours instilling fear in the rebels so that they cannot dictate terms. >By contrast, Assams elected chief minister, Tarun Gogoi, has been strongly >supportive of negotiations. Singh and some others in the security >establishment would probably interpret Kakopathar as no more than a >temporary setback. But if a single incident could become a trigger to such >public anger and expression of pro-ULFA sentiments, one can hardly have >confidence in the security establishments reading of the ground situation >and its recipe for bringing about peace. > >Indias track record of ending internal armed conflicts is quite poor. >Today the world has numerous intra-state armed conflicts, and everywhere >they last long on average about seven years as opposed to six months for >international wars according to one count. However, the duration of >intra-state armed conflicts in India and in the rest of south Asia have >been much longer than the world average. The Naga war despite the >nine-year old ceasefire will soon enter the sixth decade, making it one >of the worlds oldest armed conflicts. > >There are many reasons why most of our conflicts have been long-lasting. >But one common factor seems to suggest itself. Those who study armed >internal conflicts emphasize the role of a mutually hurting stalemate >felt by conflicting parties as a necessary condition for pushing >conflicts in the direction of a negotiated settlement. These theorists >argue that when parties realize that further military escalation would not >produce victory and that the costs of the status quo are unacceptably >high, a conflict becomes ripe for resolution. > >But in India, even when conflicts have been terribly hurtful, localized >suffering has not easily translated into high costs for the government >side. Doing something about conflicts in the Northeast may be important >for our national-level politicians, but no government has fallen because >of the way it has handled or mishandled them. And after decades of >counter-insurgency and attention to security, we have further cushioned >our decision-making elites from the hurting effects of a stalemate. > >In a new two-tiered order, the top echelons of the bureaucracy, the army >and the political establishment who live and travel with very high levels >of security are now the security haves. Under these conditions, despite >enormous suffering by civilians, those who favour a military solution or >rather a victors peace tend to win policy arguments. They seem to believe >that given the obvious military superiority of the governments side, all >armed groups can be eventually bullied into submission. This of course has >meant, in effect, stalemated long-duration armed conflicts and the costs >being paid almost entirely by the security have-nots. > >One obvious lesson of Kakopathar is that counter-insurgency operations and >efforts toward a negotiated peace do not go together. Kakopathar >underscores the absence of a solid coalition on the government side in >support of negotiations. What has made the two meetings with the PCG >possible is simply an electoral calculation that in post-Illegal Migrants >(Determination by Tribunals) Act Assam, the ethnic Assamese vote might >matter to the Congress more than usual. Appearing to be on the side of a >negotiated peace with ULFA might give the Congress an edge over the Asom >Gana Parishad among this segment. But since this posture does not have to >be maintained beyond the elections, there is no need to try to build a >stable political coalition to support a negotiated peace. Thus the serious >differences between the governor and the chief minister can just be put >aside. Were we serious about a negotiated peace, there might have been >pressure for the governor to resign. After all, there could be no better >confidence-building measure than making a civilian, and someone untainted >by counter-insurgency operations, the next governor. > >Decisions made under these political conditions can only reinforce the >existing stalemate. Daniel Ellsberg had coined the term stalemate machine >to describe the American political logic of successive presidents >committing just enough resources to Vietnam so as not to violate two >critical domestic political rules of thumb: to not lose South Vietnam to >the communists before the next election and not commit US ground troops to >a land war in Asia. Pretending to work towards a negotiated peace with >ULFA while carrying on counter-insurgency operations is an Indian version >of a stalemate machine. > > > > >_______________________________________________ >assam mailing list >assam@assamnet.org >http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org _______________________________________________ assam mailing list assam@assamnet.org http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
