Well said KJD. There are several issues one needs to take vis-a--vis SB's nuance of TRADERS (and C'da's) regarding that these traders want some negotiation.
First of all, insurgents *do not want* to be classified as Terrorists - if one happens to read across the board (not just the anti-establishment (Read Govt.)) research and conflict resoultion papers about armed groups, a clearer picture emerges. Many problems are associated with that label. That is why pro-ULFA sympathizers are trying very hard to pass off the ulfa as a"freedom" or "insurgent" group. The problems that arise are: once included in the sh**t list (like ULFA in the the US list) its difficult even if peace comes about to get off that list. No country can overtly side with terrorists. Second, countries do not want to "negotiate" with NON-State groups like the ULFA. Any solutions found cannot be assigned to a group whose make up (and accountabilty) is highly suspect. Remember the ulfa released by the GOi - they promptly took up arms again. The more a country keeps talking to such groups, the more they are given legitamacy and recognition - and thats what these groups and their sympathizers want. C'da keeps asking "do they want the ULFA to just disappear?" Lets turn this around, does he or other sympathizers or the ULFA think that the GOI or India will just vanish into the thin air, just because they want to wish it away? Do they think, that Delhi and the GOA is filled with less than intelligent officials who have no clue what and how to deal with groups like the ulfa? I would say this - that local/national politics gets in the way of what the GOI/Army might really want to do. That is what makes them go soft. IMHO - some talks should definitely be there - but the GOI must be adamant that certain things like lay down the arms, and the "S" word be off the table.
It is nave to think that rebel groups would simply give up the battle and
surrender >once they lose militarily to government forces. After all, even the most >elementary lesson of armed conflicts suggests that military power is only one >factor among many in determining outcomes. Maybe that the "army" is only a part of the soltuion, But no govt. can sit by quietly, while a group of thugs go on a rampage. But it looks like when an "insurgent" group seeks only violence as it main arsenal, then that is the response they should be ready for, instead of having their supporters fan out and cru Uncle! Incidentally, the Khalistan demand in the Punjab started with a bang, continued with violence, they even blew up an Air India flight, and then they are all gone with a wimper. The GOI got its way. The Russians (I think) have also got the better of the Chechnian "insurgents". The Chinese, just shoot all the "insurgents" when they start giving a bit of trouble. I would like to ask experts here - how many of these low-intensity armed conflicts (whether their cause is legitimate or not) have actually become a "country" (in the modern era - within the last 50 years of so)? What are the ultimate payoffs? It would be interesting to find out. --Ram On 6/12/07, kamal deka <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: kamal deka <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Jun 12, 2007 12:50 PM Subject: Re: [Assam] Protests against Ulfa in Assam To: Sanjib Baruah <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> I don't want to descend to the level,inhabited by the semi-literates,like those retards, representing various trade unions of Assam ,who demanded negotiation between ULFA and the Govt. because of unfortunate death of innocent civilians.Negotiation on what ? In regard to kissing good-bye to Assam? No Govt. of this world has the ability to protect every single citizen of the country from terrorist's attack,but every nation has the option of not compromising with the terrorist's demands.Passivity is judged by the terrorists as weakness.Every Govt.has the capacity to hurt and punish the terrorists and in the process the Govt. must be prepared to take a few bruises.To pin all hopes on parleys regarding a demand purely detrimental to the country,is suicidal.True,the satisfaction of public needs is the sole justification of Government.But,even if 100 people ( those innocents,who got killed by the terrorists) are part of the public,they are a very minuscule part of it and therefore expendable.Sounds horrendous,but look at tiny Israel,the country with a different attitude.That's why they exists against all odds,surrounded by hostile Arab nations.They don't breast-beat over the possible death of 0.000001% of the population.I tell you,those desi folks make me sick. I always maintain that the travesty of the demand by the ULFA is that they want the freedom to secede exclusively for themselves.In that case,the Govt. will have to hold dialogue,conducted in an atmosphere of terror every ten years or so in order to meet the demands of new generations,at whose whims the boundaries of the country can be defined and redefined.Would it very be difficult to imagine the chaos,it would create,if such recipe were to be applied in a multi-ethnic society as Assam's ? KJD On 6/11/07, Sanjib Baruah <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070612/asp/opinion/story_7908619.asp > > NEVER A MOMENT TO BREATHE EASY > > Sanjib Baruah > > Telegraph (Calcutta) June 12, 2007 > > After yet another bloodbath carried out by Ulfa, Sanjib Baruah ponders > whether negotiations can still hold the magic answer in Assam > > > The public protests in Assam against the killing of innocent civilians > by > the United Liberation Front of Asom in indiscriminate bombings are good > news. However, it would be premature to read them as a sign that a big > change is round the corner, since another kind of reaction is also > visible. An umbrella body of 30 trade associations, representing groups > that bore the brunt of Ulfas attacks, has strongly come out in support > of > unconditional talks with Ulfa. > > The implications of this response are ambiguous. It is a contrast from > the > way similar groups had reacted when Ulfa targeted Hindi-speaking > labourers > last winter. The call then was for more security, for increased presence > > of the army, and for tougher counter-insurgency operations. The Ulfa may > have reasons to be quite pleased with this turn of events. > > Counter-insurgency experts might see the support for talks among new > groups as Ulfas devious game-plan. Indeed, this explains why some people > > feel that, with growing evidence of Ulfas isolation, there is even less > reason for the government to talk to it now than before. > > This view, however, ignores the logic of asymmetric warfare. Insurgents > everywhere choose tactics that play to their strengths, not to their > weaknesses, vis--vis governments. It is nave to think that rebel groups > would simply give up the battle and surrender once they lose militarily > to > government forces. After all, even the most elementary lesson of armed > conflicts suggests that military power is only one factor among many in > determining outcomes. > > Thus, when tough security barriers go up to protect VIPs and > strategically > or symbolically important public places, it is only to be expected that > insurgent groups would turn to soft targets. The people can be excused > for > being shocked and surprised by such insurgent tactics, but those in > charge > of devising official strategy cannot claim to be equally surprised. They > > must be able to outsmart insurgent leaders, and anticipate how the logic > > of asymmetrical warfare plays out. > > There is a difference between the way governments as institutions may > want > to respond to insurgent demands, and those who bear the brunt of their > threats and actions might. Such a difference becomes apparent in a > situation like a kidnapping, when a government position of never > negotiating with terrorists does not resonate with the families of > victims. Insurgent groups can try to leverage this intrinsic asymmetry. > > There is plenty of evidence of insurgent groups making civilians pawns > in > their conflicts. A study at Uppsala Universitys Peace and Conflict > Research Department found that in hundreds of low-intensity armed > conflicts worldwide, attacks on civilians are a tactic of choice by > armed > rebel groups engaged in asymmetric warfare with government forces. > According to Lisa Hultman, the author of this study, by targeting > civilians, rebel groups signal both their resolve to continue the battle > > and their willingness to pay high costs in order to pursue victory > against > a militarily stronger adversary. > > This finding is in keeping with a long intellectual tradition of > military > thought that sees war as a violent form of bargaining. Insurgent groups, > > of course, realize that in attacking civilians, they run the risk of > alienating their primary audience, from whom they draw their core > support. > The protests against Ulfas actions underscore that risk. At the same > time, > the return for such grave risks can be quite high. Targeting civilians > in > a foreign country is not quite the same as targeting civilians at home. > Yet the terrorist attacks by al Qaida on the Madrid trains in 2004 must > count as one of the most spectacular examples of political gains derived > > from an attack on civilians. The attacks caused a rift between the > people > of Spain and their elected government, and precipitated the withdrawal > of > Spanish troops from Iraq. > > What then are our policy choices in Assam today? The failure of two > decades of counter-insurgency speaks for itself. At the same time, it is > hard to argue that negotiations hold the magic answer at this stage. > Insurgent groups do not usually fight long and costly battles against > impossible military odds, for what someone once called the mere > privilege > of quitting. Ulfa is unlikely to be an exception. > > There is, however, a sense of deja vu about the current situation which > is > disturbing. Assam has been in similar situations before. Indeed > counter-insurgency in the North-east is replete with instances of > history > repeating itself. Indian officials in charge of counter-insurgency never > tire of repeating the clich that there are no military solutions, and > that > a solution ultimately would have to be political. Yet there is little > sign > of any change in a strategy that seeks to establish the military > superiority of the government in the expectation that it would force > insurgent groups to accept peace on its terms. There is little evidence > of > an ability to respond to the adaptive capabilities of its adversaries, > and > to their ability to constantly take conflicts to new realms. Still, no > one > except the civilians of the region has had to pay a price for this long > history of policy failure. > > The author is at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and the > Indian > Institute of Technology, Guwahati. > > > _______________________________________________ > assam mailing list > assam@assamnet.org > http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org > _______________________________________________ assam mailing list assam@assamnet.org http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
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