How about a compromise on the source insertion thing...
Paul Hoffman's proposed text for the first paragraph in Section 5 starts off
with a set of examples of why one would want to sign or encrypt atom entries
or feeds. (Discount coupons, bank statements, etc.) These examples were
requested by the IESG. In my opinion, none of the examples really speaks to
current uses of Atom. Thus, I would suggest that we either replace one of
the existing examples or add a new one with wording something like:
A publisher might digitally sign an entry, which included
an atom:source element, in order to ensure that verifiable
attribution for the entry was available if that entry was
copied into another feed or distributed via some other means.
I believe this improves the existing proposed text by providing a much more
immediately probable example than those currently listed. Additionally, by
alluding to the issue of including the source element it may at least tend
to cause implementers to consider the wisdom of including source elements in
signed entries. Finally, since the provision of examples is something that
was explicitly requested as part of the IESG review, this should not cause
any delay beyond those that are already inevitable.
bob wyman
