How about a compromise on the source insertion thing... Paul Hoffman's proposed text for the first paragraph in Section 5 starts off with a set of examples of why one would want to sign or encrypt atom entries or feeds. (Discount coupons, bank statements, etc.) These examples were requested by the IESG. In my opinion, none of the examples really speaks to current uses of Atom. Thus, I would suggest that we either replace one of the existing examples or add a new one with wording something like:
A publisher might digitally sign an entry, which included an atom:source element, in order to ensure that verifiable attribution for the entry was available if that entry was copied into another feed or distributed via some other means. I believe this improves the existing proposed text by providing a much more immediately probable example than those currently listed. Additionally, by alluding to the issue of including the source element it may at least tend to cause implementers to consider the wisdom of including source elements in signed entries. Finally, since the provision of examples is something that was explicitly requested as part of the IESG review, this should not cause any delay beyond those that are already inevitable. bob wyman