Hi Jeff,

Some explicit text would be appreciated.  While escape isn't expected, we're
partially having some of this review because escape has been observed from
existing implementations.
[jorge] OK, added some text in the security considerations section, and also in 
section 4. We can always improve it at a later version.

Part of the additional text you've added is this:
"As an additional security mechanism, a PE following this specification that 
receives an EVPN route from a non-upgraded PE should discard the route via 
policy if the route contains the D-PATH attribute."

How do you tell if the PE is "non-upgraded"?

Note that such considerations were part of the reason I urged the dpath authors 
towards a BGP capability. :-)


Note that this is for layer 2 routes that are NOT redistributed to any PE-CE 
protocol or any other AFI/SAFI, and the D-PATH is generated/modified 
exclusively by the Gateways. The gateways are typically redundant and upgraded 
in pairs, and they are well known in an EVPN domain. So the non-upgraded 
gateways are well known and if needed, it should be easy to apply a policy for 
routes coming from them with D-PATH. We can go through the scenarios as we did 
for the dpath draft, but we are confident this is a controlled walled garden 
layer 2 environment. The additional text is hardening the implementation in 
case it is needed as per your suggestion.

When you say “escape has been observed from existing implementations” I assume 
you meant “existing implementations of dpath for ISF routes (IP reachability)”, 
and not for layer-2 routes, right? The text in this document indicates that 
this is only for routes imported in layer 2 FIBs.

Thanks!
Jorge


From: Jeffrey Haas <jh...@pfrc.org>
Date: Monday, June 24, 2024 at 6:40 AM
To: Jorge Rabadan (Nokia) <jorge.raba...@nokia.com>
Cc: draft-ietf-bess-evpn-dp...@ietf.org <draft-ietf-bess-evpn-dp...@ietf.org>, 
bess@ietf.org <bess@ietf.org>, idr-cha...@ietf.org <idr-cha...@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Questions about route selection in draft-ietf-bess-evpn-dpath-00

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Jorge,



On Jun 24, 2024, at 8:04 AM, Jorge Rabadan (Nokia) 
<jorge.raba...@nokia.com<mailto:jorge.raba...@nokia.com>> wrote:
I understand that for this D-PATH feature that the providers should be
"mutually cooperating" and thus this may be a trivial or even silly concern.
But if it ever becomes competing providers, this becomes a conversation
about money.

[jorge] ok, I think ask the chairs for 5 minutes at IETF120 to discuss this and 
bring awareness. For the moment we can leave it as is, since there are 
implementations doing this. Thanks for the discussion.

I'll try to be available for that discussion.  However, as usual, bess has 
conflicts with other work of interest for me.


It'd be helpful if you did.  I'm glad I came to the appropriate conclusion
as a semi-informed reader, but for these sorts of steps having the algorithm
explicitly written out can remove doubt.
[jorge] hopefully the text makes it better now:

“Then routes with the numerically lowest left-most Domain-ID are preferred 
(only the Domain-ID is compared, and not the ISF_SAFI_TYPE). Hence, routes not 
tied for the numerically lowest left-most Domain-ID are removed from 
consideration. When comparing two Domain-IDs, the two six byte values are 
compared starting with the Global Admin field. The lowest value in the first 
differing byte between the two six byte values, is considered to belong to the 
"numerically lowest Domain-ID"”

This works.


Some explicit text would be appreciated.  While escape isn't expected, we're
partially having some of this review because escape has been observed from
existing implementations.
[jorge] OK, added some text in the security considerations section, and also in 
section 4. We can always improve it at a later version.

Part of the additional text you've added is this:
"As an additional security mechanism, a PE following this specification that 
receives an EVPN route from a non-upgraded PE should discard the route via 
policy if the route contains the D-PATH attribute."

How do you tell if the PE is "non-upgraded"?

Note that such considerations were part of the reason I urged the dpath authors 
towards a BGP capability. :-)

-- Jeff

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