On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 5:16 PM, Eric Voskuil <e...@voskuil.org> wrote: > On 03/08/2017 03:12 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote: >> In that way, I see BIP150 as an extension of IP addresses, except more >> secure against network-level attackers. If you believe the concept of >> people establishing links along existing trust lines is a problem, you >> should be arguing against features in Bitcoin software that allows >> configuring preferred IP addresses to connect to as well (-addnode and >> -connect in Bitcoin Core, for example). > > Weak identity is insufficient to produce the problem scenario that is at > the heart of my concern (excluding people). It is this "[same] except > more secure" distinction that is the problem. You brush past that as if > it did not exist.
So you're saying that a -onlyacceptconnectionsfrom=IP option wouldn't be a concern to you because it can't exclude people? Of course it can exclude people - just not your ISP or a state-level attacker. Please, Eric. I think I understand your concern, but this argument isn't constructive either. The proposal here is to introduce visible node identities on the network. I think that's misguided as node count is irrelevant and trivial to fake anyway. But you bringing up BIP150 here isn't useful either. I know that you equate the concept of having verifiable identity keys in the P2P with a step towards making every node identifiable, but they are not the same. It's just a cryptographic tool to keep a certain class of attackers from bypassing restrictions that people can already make. -- Pieter _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
