Hi yanmaani On Sun, Oct 17, 2021 at 5:28 PM yanmaani--- via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> What, no. The `k` value is calculated implicitly, because there's only > one value of it that could ever be valid - if `k` is 1 too small, we're > 70 years too far back, and then the block will violate median of last > 11. If `k` is 1 too large, we're 70 years too far in the future, then > the block will violate 2 hour rule. Nothing is added to coinbase or > anywhere else. > > It's possible that you'd need some extra logic for locktime, yes, but it > would only be a problem in very special cases. Worst-case, you'll have > to use block time locking in the years around the switch, or softfork in > 64-bit locking. > > But unless I'm missing something, 32-bit would be enough, you just > wouldn't be able to locktime something past the timestamp for the > switch. After the switchover, everything would be back to normal. > > This is a hardfork, yes, but it's a hardfork that kicks in way into the > future. And because it's a hardfork, you might as well do anything, as > long as it doesn't change anything now. > "Anything" is quite a word. Ideally, hard fork requires upgrading every node that can be upgraded, or at least have the node operator's consent to lose the node (for every node that can't be upgraded). > > On 2021-10-15 22:22, vju...@gazeta.pl wrote: > > Your solution seems to solve the problem of chain halting, but there > > are more issues. For example: if you have some time modulo 2^32, then > > you no longer know if timestamp zero is related to 1970 or 2106 or > > some higher year. Your "k" value representing in fact the most > > significant 32 bits of 64-bit timestamp has to be stored in all cases > > where time is used. If there is no "k", then zero should be used for > > backward compatibility. Skipping "k" could cause problems related to > > OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY or nLockTime, because if some transaction was > > timestamped to 0xbadc0ded, then that transaction will be valid in > > 0x00000000badc0ded, invalid in 0x0000000100000000, and valid again in > > 0x00000001badc0ded, the same for timelocked outputs. > > > > So, I think your "k" value should be added to the coinbase > > transaction, then you can combine two 32-bit values, the lower bits > > from the block header and the higher bits from the coinbase > > transaction. Also, adding your "k" value transaction nLockTime field > > is needed (maybe in a similar way as transaction witness was added in > > Segwit), because in other case after reaching 0x0000000100000000 all > > off-chain transactions with timelocks around 0x00000000ffffffff will > > be additionally timelocked for the next N years. The same is needed > > for each OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY, maybe pushing high 32 bits before the > > currently used value will solve that (and assuming zero if there is > > only some 32-bit value). > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >
_______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
