Hi Peter, > Point is, the attacker is thousands of UTXOs can also DoS rounds by simply > failing to complete the round. In fact, the double-spend DoS attack requires > more resources, because for a double-spend to be succesful, BTC has to be > spent > on fees. > > It's just a fact of life that a motivated attacker can DoS attack Wasabi by > spending money. That's a design choice that's serving them well so far.
There are 2 things: 1) Based on my understanding, round will not be aborted if a threshold is met for inputs and will continue irrespective of attacker trying different things in the initial phases of round. I need to confirm this by testing although not feeling well today so it can take a few days. 2) Points mentioned by Greg Sanders are reasonable: There can be a different 'mempool view' for coordinator, users and attacker. Attacker could use minimum fee rate required for relay and this works differently when there is enough demand for blockspace. Double spend attack requires only one laptop and a few UTXOs. Even if spent in some cases, would pay a few sats per transaction which won't be an issue for governments or competitors that normally perform such attacks. The vulnerability reported is different from the things being discussed and hopefully I will do a public disclosure this month. I observed some interesting things which I wanted to discuss. Full RBF pull request is already merged in bitcoin core and available in bitcoin knots if some users want to experiment. /dev/fd0 Sent with Proton Mail secure email. ------- Original Message ------- On Friday, July 8th, 2022 at 2:53 PM, Peter Todd <p...@petertodd.org> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 08:46:51PM +0000, alicexbt wrote: > > > Hi Peter, > > > > > Note that Wasabi already has a DoS attack vector in that a participant > > > can stop > > > participating after the first phase of the round, with the result that the > > > coinjoin fails. Wasabi mitigates that by punishing participating in future > > > rounds. Double-spends only create additional types of DoS attack that > > > need to > > > be detected and punished as well - they don't create a fundamentally new > > > vulerability. > > > > I agree some DoS vectors are already mitigated however punishment in this > > case will be difficult because the transaction is broadcasted after signing > > and before coinjoin tx broadcast. > > > > Inputs are already checked multiple times for double spend during coinjoin > > round: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/pull/6460 > > > > If all the inputs in the coinjoin transaction that failed to relay are > > checked and one or more are found to be spent later, what will be punished > > and how does this affect the attacker with thousands of UTXOs or normal > > users? > > > Point is, the attacker is thousands of UTXOs can also DoS rounds by simply > failing to complete the round. In fact, the double-spend DoS attack requires > more resources, because for a double-spend to be succesful, BTC has to be > spent > on fees. > > It's just a fact of life that a motivated attacker can DoS attack Wasabi by > spending money. That's a design choice that's serving them well so far. > > -- > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
