note: if it was possible to enforce this, we wouldn't need proof of work at all. since it isn't possible, proof of work is strictly necessary.
On Mon, Dec 5, 2022 at 9:53 AM Rijndael via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Good morning, > > That sounds like a very dangerous mode of operation. You can already hand > a transaction to a miner privately. I hand a transaction to a miner with > some reasonable fee, and then I go and broadcast a different transaction > with a minimal fee that spends the same inputs. The whole network > (including the miner I handed the tx to) could all be running with a strict > first-seen mempool policy, but we can still have a situation where the > miner creates a block with a different transaction from what you see in > your mempool. If anytime this happens, the nodes running your proposed rule > drop the block, then anyone can fork those nodes off the network whenever > they want. > > Even outside of adversarial settings, Bitcoin doesn't (and doesn't attempt > to) promise consistency across mempools. Making a consensus rule that > enforces mempool consistency is a recipe for (unintended?) chainsplits. > > - rijndael > > > On 12/5/22 7:20 AM, El_Hoy via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > The only option I see against the attack Peter Todd is doing to opt-in RBF > and 0Conf bitcoin usage is working on a bitcoin core implementation that > stops propagation of full-rbf replaced blocks. Running multiple of such > nodes on the network will add a risk to miners that enable full-rbf that > would work as an incentive against that. > > Obviously that would require adding an option on bitcoin core (that is not > technically but politically difficult to implement as Petter Todd already > have commit access to the main repository). > > That said, a sufficiently incentivized actor (like Daniel Lipshitz or Muun > wallet developers) could work on a fork and run several nodes with such > functionality. As far as I understand the percolation model, with 10 to 20 > nodes running such a rule would create a significant risk for full-rbf > miners. > > Regards. > > --- Eloy > > > On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 11:43 AM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 03:36:08PM +1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev >> wrote: >> > On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 01:16:13PM -0500, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev >> wrote: >> > > FYI I've gotten a few hundred dollars worth of donations to this >> effort, and >> > > have raised the reward to about 0.02 BTC, or $400 USD at current >> prices. >> > >> > Seems like this has been mostly claimed (0.014btc / $235, 9238sat/vb): >> >> I'm turning it back on when (if) the mempool settles down. I've got more >> than >> enough donations to give another run at it (the majority was donated >> privately >> FWIW). There's a risk of the mempool filling up again of course; hard to >> avoid >> that. >> >> Right now of course it's really easy to double spend with the obvious >> low-fee/high-fee method as the min relay fee keeps shifting. >> >> > >> https://mempool.space/tx/397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c >> > >> > The block it was claimed in seems to have been about an hour after the >> > default mempool filled up: >> > >> > https://twitter.com/murchandamus/status/1592274621977477120 >> > >> > That block actually seems to have included two >> > alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org txs, the other paying $7.88 >> > (309sat/vb): >> > >> > >> https://mempool.space/tx/ba9670109a6551458d5e1e23600c7bf2dc094894abdf59fe7aa020ccfead07cf >> >> The second is because I turned down the full-rbf reward to more normal fee >> levels. There's also another full-rbf double-spend from the Bob calendar, >> along >> the same lines: >> 7e76b351009326a574f3120164dbbe6d85e07e04a7bbdc40f0277fcb008d2cd2 >> >> I double-spent the txin of the high fee tx that got mined. But I >> mistakenly had >> RBF enabled in that double-spend, so while it propagated initially, I >> believe >> it was replaced when something (someone?) rebroadcast the high-fee 397dcb >> tx. >> >> > Timeline (utc) to me looks like: >> > >> > - 13:12 - block 763148 is mined: last one that had a min fee < >> 1.5sat/vb >> > - 13:33 - >> f503868c64d454c472859b793f3ee7cdc8f519c64f8b1748d8040cd8ce6dc6e1 >> > is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb) >> > - 18:42 - >> 746daab9bcc331be313818658b4a502bb4f3370a691fd90015fabcd7759e0944 >> > is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb) >> > - 21:52 - ba967010 tx is announced and propogates widely, since >> > conflicting tx 746daab9 has been removed from default >> > mempools >> > - 21:53 - murch tweets about default mempool filling up >> > - 22:03 - 397dcbe4 tx is announced and propogates widely, since >> > conflicting tx f503868 has already been removed from default >> > mempools >> >> Is that 22:03 time for 397 from your node's logs? It was originally >> announced >> hours earlier. From one of my full-rbf nodes: >> >> 2022-11-14T14:08:37Z [mempool] replacing tx >> 764867062b67fea61810c3858d587da83a28290545e882935a32285028084317 with >> 397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c for >> 0.00468 additional fees, -1 delta bytes >> >> > - 22:35 - block 763189 is mined >> > - 22:39 - block 763190 is mined >> > - 23:11 - block 763191 is mined >> > - 23:17 - block 763192 is mined including 397dcbe4 >> > >> > miningpool.observer reports both 397dcbe4 and ba967010 as missing in the >> > first three blocks, and gives similar mempool ages for those txs to what >> > my logs report: >> > >> > >> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/0000000000000000000436aba59d8430061e0e50592215f7f263bfb1073ccac7 >> > >> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000005600404792bacfd8a164d2fe9843766afb2bfbd937309 >> > >> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000004a3073f58c9eae40f251ea7aeaeac870daeac4b238fd1 >> > >> > That presumably means those pools (AntPool twice and "unknown") are >> > running with large mempools that didn't kept the earlier 1.2sat/vb txs. >> >> To be clear, you think that AntPool and that other exchange is running >> with a >> larger than normal max mempool size limit? You mean those miners *did* >> keep the >> earlier 1.2sat/vb tx? >> >> > The txs were mined by Foundry: >> > >> > >> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000001382a226aedac822de80309cca2bf1253b35d4f8144f5 >> > >> > This seems to be pretty good evidence that we currently don't have any >> > significant hashrate mining with fullrbf policies (<0.5% if there was a >> > high fee replacement available prior to every block having been mined), >> > despite the bounty having been collected. >> >> Oh, we can put much lower bounds on that. I've been running OTS calendars >> with >> full-rbf replacements for a few months without clear evidence of a >> full-rbf >> replacement. While there was good reason to think some miners were mining >> full-rbf before a few years back, they probably didn't bother to reapply >> their >> patches each upgrade. `mempoolfullrbf=1` is much simpler to use. >> >> -- >> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >
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