On Sat, Dec 30, 2023 at 12:11 AM David A. Harding <d...@dtrt.org> wrote: > > On 2023-12-29 15:17, Nagaev Boris wrote: > > Feerate-Dependent Timelocks do create incentives to accept out-of-band > > fees to decrease in-band fees and speed up mining of transactions > > using FDT! Miners can make a 5% discount on fees paid out-of-band and > > many people will use it. Observed fees decrease and FDT transactions > > mature faster. It is beneficial for both parties involved: senders of > > transactions save 5% on fees, miners get FDT transactions mined faster > > and get more profits (for the sake of example more than 5%). > > Hi Nagaev, > > That's an interesting idea, but I don't think that it works due to the > free rider problem: miner Alice offers a 5% discount on fees paid out of > band now in the hopes of collecting more than 5% in extra fees later due > to increased urgency from users that depended on FDTs. However, > sometimes the person who actually collects extra fees is miner Bob who > never offered a 5% discount. By not offering a discount, Bob earns more > money on average per block than Alice (all other things being equal), > eventually forcing her to stop offering the discount or to leave the > market. > > Additionally, if nearly everyone was paying discounted fees out of band, > participants in contract protocols using FDTs would know to use > proportionally higher FDT amounts (e.g. 5% over their actual desired > fee), negating the benefit to miners of offering discounted fees. > > -Dave
Good points. It makes sense! -- Best regards, Boris Nagaev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
