On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 10:52:01PM +0000, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote: > An even simpler fix would be to just require that all unconfirmed inputs in a > replacement come from the *same* replaced transaction. That would make certain > rare, but economically viable, replacements infeasible. But it would > definitely > fix the issue.
FYI I've implemented this fix, and pure replace-by-fee-rate with a minimum 2x fee-rate increate, in my Libre Relay fork: https://github.com/petertodd/bitcoin/tree/libre-relay-v26.0 Similar to my full-RBF peering fork, it uses a new service bit to ensure it's peering with other Libre Relay nodes to make transaction propagation actually works. I wouldn't call this a "public" release at this point. But people are welcome to review the code and try it out. I have a few mainnet and testnet nodes running it right now. I'm *very* interested if anyone else can find any further exploits in the pure replace-by-fee-rate code. I'm also interested to see if anyone bothers to spend the money to do the well-known, and expensive, replace-by-fee-rate DoS attacks. The fun thing about this release, is Libre Relay also removes the restrictions on OP_Return, which I'm sure will make some people quite angry... So maybe that'll give someone an incentive to attack it. :D I'm already sufficiently well connected to get oversized OP_Return's mined. So if you want to do that too, running a Libre Relay node will work. -- https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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