On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 9:55 AM, Alan Reiner <etothe...@gmail.com> wrote: > I don't want to misrepresent what happened, but how much of that was really > a risk? The block was rejected, but the transactions were not.
Some but not much. If someone flooded a bunch of duplicate concurrently announcing both spends to as many nodes as they could reach they would almost certainly gotten some conflicts into both chains. Then both chains would have gotten >6 confirms. Then one chain would pop and anyone on the popped side would see >6 confirm transactions undo. This attack would not require any particular resources, and only enough technical sophistication to run something like pynode to give raw txn to nodes at random. The biggest barriers against it were people being uninterested in attacking (as usual for all things) and there not being many (any?) good targets who hadn't shut down their deposits. They would have to have accepted deposits with <12 confirms and let you withdraw. During the event an attacker could have gotten of their deposit-able funds. On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 10:35 AM, Peter Vessenes <pe...@coinlab.com> wrote: > Can some enterprising soul determine if there were any double-spend attempts? > I'm assuming no, and if that's the case, we should talk about that publicly. There were circulating double-spends during the fork (as were visible on blockchain.info). I don't know if any conflicts made it into the losing chain, however. It's not too hard to check to see what inputs were consumed in the losing fork and see if any have been consumed by different transactions now. I agree it would be good to confirm no one was ripped off, even though we can't say there weren't any attempts. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Symantec Endpoint Protection 12 positioned as A LEADER in The Forrester Wave(TM): Endpoint Security, Q1 2013 and "remains a good choice" in the endpoint security space. For insight on selecting the right partner to tackle endpoint security challenges, access the full report. http://p.sf.net/sfu/symantec-dev2dev _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
