Here’s a new release announcement with full ID’s this time:

The v0.11 tag is signed by Andreas Schildbach’s GPG key (fingerprint E944 AE66 
7CF9 60B1 004B C32F CA66 2BE1 8B87 7A60). The commit hash is 
410d4547a7dd20745f637313ed54d04d08d28687.

Key: 16vSNFP5Acsa6RBbjEA7QYCCRDRGXRFH4m
Signature: 
IFXzt4ZdWFEpLrAXRDnQS6ZKJYGmyHDHtyAgeg/2/EaTvg41jSsUQW8rq19evT2UNp+eP0+OWgWM7iDKrTv11DY=

It’s worth noting that this problem crops up in other contexts too. For 
instance, it’s very common for people to identify PGP keys by a short 
identifier.

As it happens I do have a PGP key, fingerprint C85A AB0F 7A1C CCA3 2BFC EECC 
F2E4 861C 9988 816F, and I just signed Andreas’ key with it. However, as I’m 
not myself well connected in the web of trust, that doesn’t add a whole lot. 
But now that my key is effectively signed out of band by SwissSign so if people 
wanted to manually trace a trust path across systems, they could. I am 
skeptical anyone will :-)

Note that thanks to Gary Rowe, there is a Maven dependency checker plugin that 
verifies the (full) hashes of library dependencies. It could be better 
integrated but it provides another backstop.

Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Managing the Performance of Cloud-Based Applications
Take advantage of what the Cloud has to offer - Avoid Common Pitfalls.
Read the Whitepaper.
http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=121051231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development

Reply via email to