On Fri, Jun 6, 2014 at 10:05 AM, Peter Todd <p...@petertodd.org> wrote: > Again, you *don't* have to use brute-force prefix selection. You can > just as easily give your peer multiple prefixes, each of which > corresponds at least one address in your wallet with some false positive > rate. I explained all this in detail in my original blockchain data > privacy writeup months ago.
I'm not trying to pick nits about all the options, I just found it surprising that you were saying that data published in a super public manner is no different than something used between nodes. > I explained all this in detail in my original blockchain data privacy writeup > months ago. Communication is a two way street, Adam and I (and others) are earnestly trying— that we're not following your arguments may be a suggestion that they need to be communicated somewhat differently. I'm still failing to see the usefulness of having any prefix filtering for DH-private outputs. It really complicates the security story— in particular you don't know _now_ what activities will turn your prior information leaks into compromising ones retrospectivelly, and doesn't seem at very necessary for scanning performance. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Learn Graph Databases - Download FREE O'Reilly Book "Graph Databases" is the definitive new guide to graph databases and their applications. Written by three acclaimed leaders in the field, this first edition is now available. Download your free book today! http://p.sf.net/sfu/NeoTech _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
