> An astute observation. To clarify the quantum computing landscape: Google's 
> current quantum processors do not possess 50 logical qubits, and even if they 
> did, this would be insufficient to compromise ECDSA - let alone RSA-2048, 
> which would require approximately 20 million noisy physical qubits for 
> successful cryptanalysis [0].

That paper is pretty old. There is a recent paper from a couple of months ago 
by the same author (Craig Gidney from Google Quantum AI) claiming that you 
could break RSA-2048 with around a million noisy qubits in about a week.

Paper: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.15917

Blog post: 
https://security.googleblog.com/2025/05/tracking-cost-of-quantum-factori.html

I can't say for sure whether this approach can be applied to ECDSA; I have seen 
claims before that it has less quantum resistance than RSA-2048, but I'm unsure 
if this is still considered to be the case. And while these papers are of 
course largely theoretical in nature since nothing close to the required amount 
of qubits exists at this point, I haven't seen anyone refute these claim at 
this point. These is still no hard evidence I'm aware of that a quantum 
computer capable of breaking ECDSA is inevitable, but given the rate of 
development, there could be some cause of concern.

Getting post-quantum addresses designed, implemented and activated by 2030 in 
accordance with the recommendations in this paper seems prudent to me, if this 
is at all possible. Deactivating inactive pre-quantum UTXOs with exposed public 
keys by 2035 should certainly be considered. But I still don't feel like 
deactivating pre-quantum UTXOs without exposed public keys in general is 
warranted, at least until a quantum computer capable of breaking public keys in 
the short time between they are broadcast and included in a block is known to 
exist - and even then, only if some scheme could be devised that still allows 
spending them using some additional cryptographic proof of ownership, ZKP or 
otherwise.

--
Best,
ArmchairCryptologist

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