LGTM3 with similar conditions. If the PR takes an unreasonable amount of time to land, please let us know.
On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 9:02 PM Chris Harrelson <chris...@chromium.org> wrote: > LGTM2 with the same conditions as Daniel. Thanks also for following up > with a summary before proceeding with rollout! > > On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 11:56 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> > wrote: > >> Thanks Daniel. As a quick update, this was just enabled at 1% Stable in >> M115 (released yesterday). We have not seen any blockers come up from Beta, >> but since issues may arise mainly in the long tail of sites we might not >> see anything until Stable anyway. We'll keep an eye on our experimental >> rollout and follow up here with a summary. >> >> On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 11:52 AM Daniel Bratell <bratel...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> I've been waiting a bit to see if the experiment would blow anything up, >>> but if it doesn't, and continue to not do so, then >>> >>> LGTM1 as soon as the PR has landed. >>> >>> /Daniel >>> On 2023-06-14 17:40, Yoav Weiss wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, June 8, 2023 at 5:53:49 PM UTC+2 Chris Thompson wrote: >>> >>> On Wed, Jun 7, 2023 at 9:41 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for working on this! >>> >>> On Wed, Jun 7, 2023 at 11:44 PM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks all. Some updates: >>> >>> - We have filed a TAG review request >>> <https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/853> >>> - We are working on writing WPTs and we will update this thread when >>> those are ready -- thanks for the added details about how those are run >>> - We have added a `Non-Authoritative-Reason: HttpsUpgrades` header >>> to the synthetic redirects (CL >>> <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/4584420>, >>> which we are planning to merge back to M-115) >>> - We are continuing to iterate on the spec PR >>> >>> For now we will continue to provide updates on this I2S -- closer to >>> M115 going to Stable we may send an I2E to request the ability to proceed >>> with a 1% Stable experiment if we have not yet been able to resolve >>> everything here. >>> >>> @Harald Alvestrand <h...@google.com> : In general, this feature should >>> work fine with captive portals. A captive portal that intercepts HTTPS >>> connections will result in a certificate error, which will cause the >>> upgrade to fail and automatically fall back to HTTP. Alternatively, the >>> captive portal could reset the connection for HTTPS requests, which would >>> accomplish the same. >>> >>> We have had one report of a middlebox that returned an HTTP 404 error >>> over HTTPS instead of rejecting the connection, causing breakage (the >>> upgraded HTTPS page would load but have useless content). We do not believe >>> the browser should fallback on *application* level errors, as they do >>> not provide a useful signal that the site does not support HTTPS -- in the >>> vast majority of cases the same application error will occur over HTTP as >>> well. (This specific case was an enterprise situation, with an enterprise >>> installed root certificate making the middlebox's HTTPS work, and we have >>> enterprise policies to allow organizations to disable upgrades for affected >>> hosts.) >>> >>> >>> What's our plan to tackle such issues? Do we have an enterprise policy >>> in place? >>> >>> >>> >>> We have two enterprise policies for this feature: >>> >>> - HttpsUpgradesEnabled >>> <https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#HttpsUpgradesEnabled> can >>> be used to disable this feature on managed clients (we have a similar >>> policy <https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#HttpsOnlyMode> for >>> Chrome's HTTPS-First Mode, i.e. the opt-in "Always use secure >>> connections" >>> setting) >>> - HttpAllowlist >>> <https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/#HttpAllowlist> can be >>> used to allowlist hostnames or hostname patterns -- these will then not >>> be >>> upgraded on managed clients (this also applies to HTTPS-First Mode) >>> >>> There are two "escape hatches" for users who encounter breakage and need >>> to fall back to HTTP, although from prior measurement we expect this to be >>> rare: >>> >>> - If the user explicitly types an "http://"; URL into the Omnibox >>> (with the scheme), we skip upgrading that navigation and add the host to >>> the allowlist. >>> - If the user sets the "Insecure Content" content setting ( >>> chrome://settings/content/insecureContent) to "Allowed" for the >>> site, then we skip upgrading navigations. (This setting also disables >>> mixed >>> content autoupgrading >>> >>> <https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-mixed-content/level2.html#upgrade-algorithm> >>> -- >>> for HTTPS Upgrades and HTTPS-First Mode we rely on Mixed Content Level 2 >>> to >>> ensure no plaintext subresource requests are sent.) >>> >>> >>> That makes sense! >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jun 7, 2023 at 1:02 AM Harald Alvestrand <h...@google.com> wrote: >>> >>> How will this affect login to captive portals (WiFi login), which >>> frequently rely on rewriting HTTP requests? >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 6, 2023 at 12:00 AM 'Panos Astithas' via blink-dev < >>> blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote: >>> >>> On Wed, May 31, 2023 at 7:31 AM Mike West <mk...@google.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> -mike >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 31, 2023 at 4:17 PM Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> wrote: >>> >>> As a long-time user of HTTPS-first mode, I'm excited to see this ship >>> ASAP! >>> >>> On Wed, May 31, 2023, 5:29 a.m. 'Mike West' via blink-dev < >>> blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote: >>> >>> On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 1:32 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 3:36 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote: >>> >>> I am enthusiastic about this (and not just because it should allow us to >>> deprecate/remove `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`). A few comments inline: >>> >>> On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 1:13 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Contact emailscth...@chromium.org, dadr...@google.com >>> >>> Explainerhttps://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.md >>> >>> Specificationhttps://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655 >>> >>> >>> Thanks for putting this together! I'll leave some comments on the PR. >>> Given that we haven't gotten any feedback from Fetch editors, it might be >>> prudent to let them take a pass before locking in our current behavior. >>> >>> >>> Yes, hopefully we can get some feedback, but I'm optimistic that we >>> won't be locking in behavior if we ship this as it should hopefully be not >>> site or user visible, so if we need to change the behavior to align >>> cross-browser we can iterate. >>> >>> >>> I left a few comments last week. I think the PR needs some work before >>> we can reasonably expect it to land in Fetch. >>> >>> >>> I agree (and left a few comments of my own). Would it be possible to >>> make some progress on this? Once the comments are addressed and we feel >>> good about the PR's state, could we use the Mozilla position as support and >>> publish the PR for review? (It's currently marked as a draft, which may >>> explain why it wasn't reviewed by Fetch editors) >>> >>> >>> Friendly ping on making progress on the PR! :) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Do we have tests in place for this behavior in Web Platform Tests? >>> https://wpt.fyi/results/mixed-content/tentative/autoupgrades?label= >>> experimental&label=master&aligned holds some tests for subresources, >>> but I didn't see any around navigation or fallback behavior (which seems >>> like it might need some WPT infrastructure change to produce a domain >>> that's only served over HTTP). >>> >>> >>> We do not have Web Platform Tests but we can look into adding them. >>> Currently this is implemented in //chrome which I think might make this >>> more difficult (my understanding is that the WPT suite is run against >>> content_shell rather than chrome). We are currently relying on browser >>> tests for our integration testing. >>> >>> >>> WPT is a pretty important part of shipping features that affect the >>> platform. It would be ideal if we could share these tests with our friends >>> at other vendors (and update existing tests that might be expecting >>> different behavior). Shifting the implementation to //content to make that >>> possible would also have the advantage of helping other Chromium embedders >>> ship this feature, which would be excellent for consistency in the project. >>> >>> >>> Note that the official WPT results on wpt.fyi are using full Chrome >>> builds. IIRC there are other features that require Chrome. I personally >>> only consider having WPTs passing on upstream infra to be blocking I2S. >>> @Panos >>> Astithas <pastit...@google.com> can say more authoritatively. >>> >>> >>> Indeed, upstream WPT results use full Chrome (and Firefox, Safari, etc.) >>> through wptrunner. Soon, this will also be the case when running WPT in >>> Chromium CI on Linux, once some blockers have been resolved. >>> >>> Panos >>> >>> +1 to the benefits of having this in content, but I personally think >>> that's outside the scope of API owners so not something that should block >>> an I2S. >>> >>> >>> I agree with this. I didn't mean to imply that //content implementation >>> was necessary, but that _having_ web platform tests is important for >>> interop. Browser tests are less useful in that regard. :) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Summary >>> >>> Automatically and optimistically upgrade all main-frame navigations to >>> HTTPS, with fast fallback to HTTP. >>> >>> >>> Blink componentInternals>Network>SSL >>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Internals%3ENetwork%3ESSL> >>> >>> TAG reviewFetch change process does not mention a TAG review, therefore >>> this is N/A (https://github.com/whatwg/fetch#pull-requests) >>> >>> >>> Blink's process does mention a TAG review. I think it would be a good >>> idea to put this in front of them. I also think they will appreciate it, >>> since it's directly in line with their previous guidance (e.g. >>> https://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/web-https). >>> >>> >>> >>> Sure, we can file a TAG review. I'll update this thread once that's done. >>> >>> >>> TAG review statusNot applicable >>> >>> Risks >>> >>> >>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>> >>> *Gecko*: Positive (https://github.com/mozilla/ >>> standards-positions/issues/800) Firefox is offering a similar feature >>> already in their private browsing mode by default >>> >>> *WebKit*: No signal (https://github.com/WebKit/ >>> standards-positions/issues/185) >>> >>> *Web developers*: No signals. This feature is not exposed directly to >>> web developers or users. However, HTTPS adoption is now standard practice >>> (>90% of page loads in Chrome use HTTPS), and automatically upgrading >>> navigations to HTTPS would avoid unnecessary redirects from HTTP to HTTPS >>> for site owners. The `upgrade-insecure-requests` header has some similar >>> functionality, and according to HTTP-Archive is found on ~6% of all >>> requests. >>> >>> *Other signals*: >>> >>> WebView application risks >>> >>> Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such >>> that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications? >>> >>> >>> Debuggability >>> >>> Chrome will upgrade these navigations to HTTPS using a 307 internal >>> redirect, which will be visible in the Network panel of Developer Tools. >>> >>> >>> For HSTS, we synthesize a `Non-Authoritative-Reason` header on the >>> synthetic redirect that tells developers why the redirect happened. Is that >>> a pattern y'all will follow here as well? If so, it's probably a good idea >>> to document it somewhere; I don't think we've explained that header well. :) >>> >>> >>> Good idea. I'll get a CL up to add this to our implementation, and it >>> seems reasonable to merge back to M115. We can include a mention of it in >>> any public facing documentation we write about this. I'm also looking into >>> whether we can add NetLog events for the upgrade and fallback steps which >>> could help with triaging bug reports. >>> >>> >>> Thanks! >>> >>> Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, >>> Linux, Chrome OS, Android, and Android WebView)?No >>> >>> Currently not available on Android WebView. We are implementing this >>> first for Chrome and will consider bringing this to WebView (likely as an >>> embedder opt-in) as follow up work. >>> >>> >>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>> ?No >>> >>> Flag namehttps-upgrades >>> >>> Requires code in //chrome?True >>> >>> >>> Can you spell out what's required here? Just enterprise policy work, or >>> are there other things embedders would need to implement to make this >>> functionality work? >>> >>> >>> This feature is currently implemented in //chrome with some support code >>> in content/'s NavigationRequest. I think it would be feasible to migrate >>> the core of this into content/ -- we use an URLRequestLoaderInterceptor and >>> a NavigationThrottle to implement the upgrading and fallback logic. This is >>> currently shared with Chrome's HTTPS-First Mode (controlled by Chrome's >>> "Always use secure connections" setting). If we did migrate this logic to >>> content/, embedders would need to add their own support for at least (1) >>> how to handle allowlisting hostnames, and (2) enterprise policies for >>> enabling/disabling the feature and exempting hostnames. We do not have a >>> design ready for making this change though. >>> >>> >>> As mentioned above, it would be ideal for the pieces of this change that >>> affect the platform to be available in //content so they flow into >>> content_shell and other embedders. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Tracking bughttps://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id= >>> 1394910 >>> >>> Launch bughttps://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4235192 >>> >>> Sample links >>> http://example.com will upgrade to https://example.com. >>> http://www.alwayshttp.com will upgrade to https://www.alwayshttp.com but >>> fall back to http://www.alwayshttp.com because the site doesn't support >>> HTTPS. >>> >>> Estimated milestonesShipping on desktop115Shipping on Android115 >>> >>> We are planning to do a field trial to gradually roll out this feature >>> to Chrome clients in Chrome 115. >>> >>> >>> Over what time period do you expect to ramp up to 100%? If you expect it >>> to push beyond the M115 timeframe, it might be reasonable to frame this as >>> an intent to experiment to give folks a little more time to weigh in on the >>> Fetch PR. >>> >>> >>> We are hoping to ramp up to 100% within M115, but it may end up >>> completing in M116. >>> >>> (We could do an I2E, but it did not seem like a good fit as there is no >>> Origin Trial component, this does not require developer involvement, etc. >>> Our understanding was even doing a non-OT 1% Stable rollout required >>> sending an I2S and getting LGTMs from API OWNERS. Let us know if you think >>> we should reassess our launch plan.) >>> >>> >>> We do have an experimentation path for running a Finch experiment on >>> stable/beta users (confusingly(?) under "Origin Trial" >>> <https://www.chromium.org/blink/launching-features/#:~:text=Depending%20on%20your,required%20before%20proceeding.> >>> in our documentation; we could probably improve that). >>> >>> I think I'd recommend that path to avoid any delays that might come up >>> in getting Fetch updated to support this feature. I'd LGTM an I2E @ 50% >>> beta/1% stable to gain confidence in the fallback mechanism at scale. For >>> I2S, I'm a little worried about the state of the spec and its eventual >>> interoperability across vendors. I'd like to get that hammered down before >>> making it harder to change details that developers might come to rely upon. >>> >>> -mike >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Anticipated spec changes >>> >>> Open questions about a feature may be a source of future web compat or >>> interop issues. Please list open issues (e.g. links to known github issues >>> in the project for the feature specification) whose resolution may >>> introduce web compat/interop risk (e.g., changing to naming or structure of >>> the API in a non-backward-compatible way). >>> https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655 >>> >>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Statushttps://chromestatus.com/ >>> feature/6056181032812544 >>> >>> Links to previous Intent discussionsIntent to prototype: https://groups. >>> google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/mgJqym5-Xek/m/0EAN6v7CCQAJ >>> >>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>> <https://chromestatus.com/>. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAKXHy%3DdPs5Spya9QBVmFYdeTJevs6jML% >>> 3DNmU7SEApOshNRmHCg%40mail.gmail.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAKXHy%3DdPs5Spya9QBVmFYdeTJevs6jML%3DNmU7SEApOshNRmHCg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAJ8Nf20mYRwXxCjadR5MuQ5DPj7nH >>> a6MGEkFe5576W1tZ8MkPQ%40mail.gmail.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAJ8Nf20mYRwXxCjadR5MuQ5DPj7nHa6MGEkFe5576W1tZ8MkPQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALMy46Q--Fj9qV%3D28_ >>> CY9au4h-Gc%3D3dYWPFNeT1g-wdmQxEvSQ%40mail.gmail.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALMy46Q--Fj9qV%3D28_CY9au4h-Gc%3D3dYWPFNeT1g-wdmQxEvSQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/4bb5bcde-794b-44ea-9a04-2c3837eac96dn%40chromium.org >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/4bb5bcde-794b-44ea-9a04-2c3837eac96dn%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALMy46S28jD1qa6imSeDvR8L33WkNeS3xh2gTkSu91Rr97ZCVQ%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALMy46S28jD1qa6imSeDvR8L33WkNeS3xh2gTkSu91Rr97ZCVQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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