Sorry, it seems I left off the signals section of the template:

Firefox: No signal (
https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/835)
Webkit: No signal (https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/214)
Web developers: No signals

On Thu, Aug 17, 2023 at 10:22 AM Ben Kelly <wanderv...@chromium.org> wrote:

> Contact emails
>
> wanderv...@chromium.org, b...@chromium.org, rtarp...@chromium.org,
> j...@chromium.org
>
> Explainer
>
>
> https://github.com/privacycg/nav-tracking-mitigations/blob/main/bounce-tracking-explainer.md
>
> Specification
>
>
> https://privacycg.github.io/nav-tracking-mitigations/#bounce-tracking-mitigations
>
> Summary
>
> This feature mitigates bounce tracking on the web.  It works by deleting
> state from sites that access storage during a redirect that the user has
> never directly interacted with.  See the specification for more details.
>
> Blink component
>
> Privacy>NavTracking
> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Privacy%3ENavTracking>
>
> TAG review
>
> https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/862
>
> TAG review status
>
> Issues addressed
>
> Risks
>
> Interoperability and Compatibility
>
> The main risk is that we will incorrectly delete state for a site that the
> user needs to continue functioning.  Our approach attempts to address this
> with a number of signals:
>
>
>    -
>
>    If a user has interacted with the site within the last 45 days, we
>    will not delete its state.
>    -
>
>    We are adding successful webauthn key assertions as another
>    "interaction" source in M117 to address SSO use cases that only require
>    security taps to stay logged in.
>    -
>
>    We only delete state if the potential tracking site is not permitted
>    as a 3P cookie.  This allows users and enterprises to grant permission to
>    maintain state on these sites through existing mechanisms.
>
>
> We have documented some known use cases at-risk
> <https://github.com/privacycg/nav-tracking-mitigations/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+label%3Abounce-tracking+label%3Aat-risk-use-case>
> .
>
> In particular, since 3P cookies are default allowed today, this feature
> will only have an immediate impact on users that have opted into 3P cookie
> blocking or incognito where 3P cookies are blocked by default.
>
> Ergonomics
>
> Minimal ergonomic risk.  There are no direct APIs to call here.  We are
> deleting state for sites behind the scenes.  We do not delete state for
> sites that are currently open.  We have devtools enhancements to help
> developers understand the process.
>
> Activation
>
> No activation risk.  There is nothing to polyfill.
>
> Security
>
> This feature does incrementally worsen existing XS-Leaks in the browser by
> exposing an additional bit of information.  Attackers can learn if a user
> has interacted with a site within the last 45 days if they are able to
> trigger a stateful bounce on the target site and execute a XS-Leak attack
> to detect the existence of cookies or state on the site.  Since bounce
> tracking mitigations are only enforced when 3P cookies are blocked,
> however, the XS-Leak must use navigations and not subresource attacks.
>
> We feel the best solution to this problem is to invest in fixing
> navigation-based XS-Leaks.  The additional bit of interaction information
> leaked in the meantime is not ideal, but it has limited utility if an
> attacker can already tell if there is state on the target site.  We are
> interested in collaborating with the security team to help address the
> underlying XS-Leak.
>
> WebView application risks
>
> We are purposely excluding WebView from this launch so we can evaluate
> impact to that platform separately.
>
> Debuggability
>
> We issue devtool "issues" when a site may potentially be deleted as a
> bounce tracking.  In addition, we have a devtools application panel to
> force the bounce tracking algorithm to run immediately.  See the
> screenshots in this blog post
> <https://developer.chrome.com/blog/bounce-tracking-mitigations-dev-trial/>
> .
>
> Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac,
> Linux, Chrome OS, Android, and Android WebView)?
>
> All except WebView.  We would like to evaluate the impact to WebView in a
> separate launch.
>
> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests
> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md>
> ?
>
> No, unfortunately.  Since this feature runs off of a long duration timer
> we cannot construct a WPT test case.  We need wpt#17489
> <https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/issues/17489> to be fixed in
> order to correct this.
>
> Flag name
>
> DIPS
>
> Requires code in //chrome?
>
> Yes.  We must integrate with features like the chrome sign-in manager,
> TabHelper, etc.  We are, however, actively working to move other code into
> the content// layer.
>
> Tracking bug
>
> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1360489
>
> Measurement
>
> We are measuring UKM for sites that have state deleted by bounce tracking
> mitigations.
>
> Availability expectation
>
> Our initial MVP implementation is launching to all platforms with the
> exception of WebView.  In addition, bounce tracking mitigations are only
> enforced in situations where the tracking domain is not permitted as a 3P
> cookie.
>
> Adoption expectation
>
> There is no specific API to adopt for this effort, but we only enforce the
> bounce tracking mitigations when 3P cookies are blocked.  Therefore we
> expect it to have a greater impact as 3P cookie blocking becomes more
> common in the future.
>
> Adoption plan
>
> N/A
>
> Non-OSS dependencies
>
> None
>
> Sample links
>
> https://bounce-tracking-demo.glitch.me/
>
> Estimated milestones
>
> Gradual rollout during M116.  Webauthn interaction support will take
> effect in M117.
>
> Anticipated spec changes
>
> We have written a monkey-patch spec here:
>
>
> https://privacycg.github.io/nav-tracking-mitigations/#bounce-tracking-mitigations
>
> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
>
> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5705149616488448
>
> Links to previous Intent discussions
>
>
> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAK7rkMi_7z0-yeTbBiE43V5SD1ri4jSVxrkR8Gs%3DD0NRoRKivA%40mail.gmail.com
>
>
> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/vyXWn1W1daA/m/tL3f1_WbAwAJ
>
>

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