At 06:00 PM 11/6/2004 +0000 Richard Baker wrote: >> An a honest question for you, but its a doozy, if you choose to >> accept it: How is this position morally different from being >> "personally opposed to the killing of Jews and counseling against >> it" but ultimately not standing in the way of it? > >Whilst these are not morally different if one is working from the axiom >that foetuses are people, but it clearly is if one does not accept said >axiom. If, for the sake of argument, one considers sufficiently >undeveloped foetuses to be morally akin to non-human animals rather >than people then the position would be analogous to being an >evangelical vegetarian but not standing in the way of people eating >meat should they choose. One might even reasonably choose a position >that placed foetuses further down the scale of things worthy of moral >consideration. As there is no discernible essence of human-ness, I >think that any reasonable position would accept that there is *some* >position along the developmental process before which abortion should >not be banned.
So, are you saying that I am not a reasonable person? >(Of course, the Nazis considered Jews to be sub-human so they would >presumably make a similar argument. This is, of course, my point. Throughout human history one group of humans has sought to define a nother group of humans that are "not like us" in some way, as not having the full rights of humanity. In every previous case, we have gone on to look with horror upon those who make those arguments. >The difference is that foetuses are >clearly not functionally equivalent to adults or even children, whereas >Jews are indistinguishable except for cultural factors [and in some >cases, perhaps, certain genetic markers] from other people.) Of course, would not the Nazis have argued that the Jews are inferior, and therfore "clearly not functionally equivalent"? This returns me to my question, however, regarding being "personally opposed" but unwilling to vote for restrictions on a behavior. You note that this question makes the most sense if "one is working from the axiom that foetuses are people" - yet, if one is "personally opposed" isn't this clearly the case? >I have a counter-question (or rather some counter-questions!). You >clearly believe in a form of essentialism that makes human life >sacrosanct. Let me assume, for the moment, that you do not believe that >chimpanzees should have the same rights as people. (If you differ from >this position, I can rebuild the thought experiment along slightly >different lines.) Now, let's suppose that some dastardly scientist has >created a whole series of foetuses that have varying amounts of human >and chimpanzee genes. At one end, there's one that's 99% human and 1% >chimpanzee. At the other end, there's one that's 1% human and 99% chimp. >Between these extremes they vary in 1% increments. Now, which of these >(if any) do you consider should be worthy of the same protection that >fully human foetuses should be accorded? Which of the adults derived >from these foetuses should have full human rights? What determines the >position of the boundary? If you consider the answer depends on exactly >which human and chimp genes are included, which factors are most >important? If you say that none are worthy of being considered human, is >there any degree of chimp genome (perhaps one gene or a section of >introns) that could be spliced in without removing the essence of >humanity? This is a difficult quesiton in a number of ways. First, I would be opposed to most such genetic engineering in the first place. Secondly, the technology described is so far beyond present capabilities as to be entirely fanciful. Suffice to say, this is a challenge without practical importance. Lastly, I agree with Dan on this being primarily Zeno's paradox. I believe that there is a line between human and non-human, although I don't have the biological expertise to draw the line specifically. JDG _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
